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The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir
Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the
Review of Jury Verdicts
Albert W. Alschulerf
The man who wants a jury has a bad case ....
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.1
I.

INTRODUCTION:

A

DISSONANT CHORUS

Our views of the jury are ambivalent. Defense attorneys, prosecutors, and judges typically proclaim their awe of the wisdom of
the jury. They report that although jurors may not always master
the technicalities of a case, they have an uncanny ability to grasp
the truth and to provide common sense justice.2
On occasion, however, particularly when the practitioners
speak of plea bargaining, their remarks about juries have a different tone. They report that submitting a case to a jury is very much
like rolling dice. As sensitive and sophisticated professionals, these
lawyers must avoid the dangers of trial. Even a "bad" plea agreement is likely to seem better than allowing a case to reach a
jury-something that the lawyers describe as a plunge from an unknown height.3 The mixture of praise and mistrust that these pract Wilson-Dickinson Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. I am grateful to
Larry B. Kramer, John H. Langbein, William T. Pizzi, Judith Resnik, Carol Sanger, Stephen J. Schulhofer, Geoffrey R. Stone, H. Richard Uviller, Welsh S. White and the participants in a workshop at the University of Chicago Law School for valuable suggestions and
to the Kirkland and Ellis Professorship Fund at the University of Chicago Law School for
research support. Excerpts from this paper were presented at the dedication of the academic
building of the John Jay College of Criminal Justice and appeared in 25 Crim L Bull at 57
(1989) under the title "The Overweight Schoolteacher from New Jersey and Other Tales:
The Peremptory Challenge After Batson."
' Mark DeWolfe Howe, ed, Holmes-Pollock Letters 74 (Belknap/Harvard, 2d ed 1961).
2 See Charles W. Joiner, From the Bench, in Rita James Simon, ed, The Jury System
in America: A Critical Overview 145, 146 (Sage, 1975) ("I have generally, but not always,
agreed with the jury verdict at the time it was rendered. But in each instance, except one,
on reflection and on deeper analysis, I have decided the jury was correct."); Franklin Delano
Strier, Through the Jurors' Eyes, 74 ABA J, 78, 81 (Oct 1, 1988) (statement of P. Terry
Anderlini, President of the California State Bar, that jurors have an "uncanny ability to
usually come up with the right result").
I See Pamela J. Utz, Settling the Facts: Discretionand Negotiation in Criminal Court
66 (Lexington, 1978) (quoting a prosecutor: "[T]hose twelve people can't really handle it.").
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titioners express brings to mind a wisecrack attributed to Mark
Twain: "We have a jury system that is superior to any in the
world, and its efficiency is only marred by the difficulty of finding
twelve men everyday who don't know anything and can't read."4
When an observer suggests that the practitioners' descriptions
of frequently erratic jury behavior are incompatible with their descriptions of the jury as a wondrous engine of justice, the practitioners nod and reply that the observer has missed the larger
unity. In the tradition of romanticizing the jury, these practitioners' views are mysterious, poetic and incomprehensible.
The same ambivalence has shaped American law. Many American trial procedures, particularly those at the "front end" of the
trial, manifest a substantial mistrust of jurors. The first two sections of this article focus on two of these procedures, the voir dire
examination of prospective jurors and the peremptory challenge.
The article also discusses other procedures and practices, including
our patronizing rules of evidence, that bespeak limited faith in
juries.
Procedures at the "back end" of the criminal trial, by contrast,
tend to manifest confidence in jurors and to treat jury verdicts as
sacrosanct. The third section of this article focuses primarily on
the rule forbidding the impeachment of jury verdicts by jurors; it
discusses as well our tolerance of inconsistent jury verdicts and our
limited review of jury determinations of fact.
The article suggests that we have captured the worst of two
worlds, creating burdensome, unnecessary and ineffective jury controls at the front end of the criminal trial while failing to imple-

Conflicting views of the jury are not new. In the late eighteenth century, various writers
described jurors as "low and ignorant country people"; as "the meaner sort"; and as "the
union of wisdom with integrity, impartiality with humanity." See P. J. R. King, "Illiterate
Plebeians,Easily Misled": Jury Composition, Experience, and Behavior in Essex, 17351815, in J. S. Cockburn and Thomas A. Green, eds, Twelve Good Men and True: The Criminal Trial Jury in England, 1200-1800 254, 257 (Princeton, 1988) (citing M. Madan,
Thoughts on Executive Justice, with Respect to the Criminal Laws, Particularlyon the
Circuits 142 (2d ed 1785); E. Cannon, ed, Adam Smith, Lectures on Justice, Police, Revenue and Arms 52 (Oxford, 1896); and the Chelmsford Chronicle (Dec 24, 1784)).
4 Although I have heard this remark attributed to Twain, I have been unable to locate
it in his writing. For a more extended discussion of the jury, see Mark Twain, Roughing It
341-43 (American, 1872) ("When the peremptory challenges were all exhausted, a jury of
twelve men was impaneled-a jury who swore that they had neither heard, read, talked
about nor expressed an opinion concerning a murder which the very cattle in the corrals...
were cognizant of! ... It actually came out afterward, that one of [the jurors] thought that
incest and arson were the same thing."). See also id at 351 ("Trial by jury is the palladium
of our liberties. I do not know what a palladium is, having never seen a palladium, but it is a
good thing no doubt. .. ").
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ment badly needed controls at the back end. Although we have
devoted substantial resources to implementing our front-end procedures, we generally have refused to expend significant resources
to determine whether they have worked. Indeed, we often have
turned aside clear evidence of their failure.
Initially, we subject jurors to lengthy, privacy-invading voir
dire examinations, requiring them to answer questions that would
be considered inappropriate and demeaning in other contexts. We
also subject prospective jurors to peremptory challenges on
grounds that in other settings would be considered discriminatory
and unconstitutional. After affording jurors substantially less dignity than other public officials at the front end of the trial, however, we exempt them from the review generally applied to governmental officials at the back end. The Supreme Court has concluded
that the constitutional prohibition of double jeopardy requires this
exemption from judicial oversight when juries acquit,5 but the
Constitution does not demand judicial blindness to unjust
convictions.
In some respects, our jury system suffers from neglect bred by
undeserved faith in its efficiency; in others, from misguided attempts at regulation. Both our failure to control the jury and our
awkward attempts to do so have contributed to the decline of the
jury trial. The American jury system encourages plea bargaining
partly because lawyers doubt the jury's ability to do its job and
believe that even a haphazard bargaining process is likely to yield
a sounder result than a trial.' The jury system also encourages plea
bargaining in a less direct and probably more important way. Our
mistrust of the jurors whom we extol has led us to surround the
criminal trial with an extraordinarily expensive and cumbersome
collection of courtroom procedures.
As we add gargoyles to an already garish temple of justice, we
proclaim that we cannot admit more than a small minority of defendants to this sacred palace. Within the temple, legal priests
5 See, for example, United States v Ball, 163 US 662, 671 (1896); United States v
Scott, 437 US 82 (1978).
' Uncertainty reduction would provide a motive for plea bargaining even were a different mode of trial substituted for jury trial, but uncertainty reduction is likely to prove a
stronger motivation for settlement in a jury system than in a nonjury system. When
factfinding is entrusted to a body of untrained, casually selected judges who are almost
never repeat players, procedural controls have only a limited ability to render the decisions
of this body predictable. Because groups tend to regress toward the mean, however, the
decisions of a twelve-person group should be-other things equal-more predictable than
the decisions of an individual. The jury's size may offset to some degree the otherwise
greater predictability of the actions of professional judges.
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baptize jurors, usher them in and out of the sanctuary as they debate how much the laity should know, and deliver incomprehensible sermons on the law. In the shadow of the temple, the same
priests press the overwhelming majority of defendants to sacrifice
the most basic of their rights, the right to trial.7
This article will focus on one paradigmatic Supreme Court decision in each of the three principal areas that it explores. In Turner v Murray," the Court held that judges in some capital cases
must question prospective jurors about their possible racial
prejudices. The Turner decision illustrates some troublesome aspects of our voir dire procedure and also leads to more general observations concerning our frequently patronizing attitude toward
jurors.
In Batson v Kentucky,9 the Supreme Court considered the
most undemocratic feature of our democratic trial system,1 0 the peremptory challenge. The frequent exercise of this challenge on the
basis of crude group stereotypes ensures that, contrary to our rhetoric, juries rarely are composed of a defendant's peers and rarely
reflect a fair cross section of the community. In Batson, the Supreme Court addressed an especially offensive and especially visible aspect of this practice-the use of peremptory challenges by
prosecutors to exclude blacks from juries in cases involving black
defendants. The Batson decision condemned only this narrowly
defined form of discrimination and provided only a weak corrective
for it. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's effort to tame the peremptory challenge-but not very much-produced cumbersome
procedures that will generate burdensome litigation for years to
come. Moreover, while remedying one sort of discrimination, Batson invited and required others. The largest part of this article will
7 Compare Yale Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions
of American
CriminalProcedure, in Yale Kamisar, Fred Inbau, and Thurman Arnold, eds, Criminal Justice in Our Time 19 (U Va, 1965); John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining,46 U
Chi L Rev 3 (1978). I do not suggest that the substantive failings, procedural flaws, and high
costs of jury trials provide the primary reasons for plea bargaining. Lawyers and judges
sometimes invoke these concerns even when they are influenced in part by others, including
considerations of their own comfort, convenience, and economic advantage. See my articles,
The Prosecutor'sRole in Plea Bargaining,36 U Chi L Rev 50 (1968); The Defense Attorney's Role in PleaBargaining,84 Yale L J 1179 (1975); and The Trial Judge's Role in Plea
Bargaining,76 Colum L Rev 1059 (1976).
* 476 US 28 (1986).
476 US 79 (1986).
10 Dictionaries define democracy as "the principle of equality of rights, opportunity and
treatment," as "lack of snobbery," and as "government by the people." See, for example,
Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language 390 (World, 1957). The jury
system seems democratic in all these senses of the term.
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explore seven areas of litigation that the Batson decision has created. The article will endorse a conclusion that Justice Marshall
reached in his concurring opinion: The Equal Protection Clause
and the peremptory challenge are incompatible."' Arbitrary exclusions from jury service have no place in a constitutional system
grounded on concepts of equality and individual worth.
The Supreme Court's decision in Tanner v United States 2 illustrates the remarkable deference that courts generally afford jury
verdicts. In this case, the Supreme Court held inadmissible the testimony of two members of a jury that several jurors had abused
alcohol, marihuana, and cocaine repeatedly during a trial. When
courts turn from front-end procedures to back-end review, considerations of judicial economy loom larger in their vision. This article
will maintain that the Supreme Court misconstrued the Federal
Rule of Evidence that it applied in Tanner and, more importantly,
that both this rule and the earlier common law rule forbidding the
impeachment of jury verdicts by jurors are unsound. Although all
forms of juror misconduct should not lead to the invalidation of
jury verdicts, misconduct of the sort alleged in Tanner should.
Courts should decide whether to accord finality to jury verdicts
without invoking see-no-evil evidentiary doctrines to shield themselves from knowledge.
Together, the three decisions that this article will examine
provide an overview of our tangled sentiments concerning the jury
and the strange procedures they have produced. We have devoted
our energies and resources mostly to symbols while turning a blind
eye to injustice.
II.

THE VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION OF PROSPECTIVE JURORS

In the United States, the process of selecting a jury is often
prolonged, sometimes consuming as much time as the trial. 3 In
one notorious case, lawyers examined more than 1000 prospective
jurors over a four month period before finding twelve who could
try the defendant. 4 A substantial minority of state courts and a
substantial majority of federal courts currently entrust the exami'

See 476 US at 108 (Marshall dissenting).

12 483 US 107 (1987).
's See Marcia Chambers, Who Should Pick Jurors, Attorneys or the Judge, NY Times
B4 (June 13, 1983) (in 20 percent of 462 cases studied by the New York Governor's Commission on Administration of Justice, voir dire took longer than the trial itself).
14 See Seale Jury Seated After 4 Months of Questioning, NY Times 43 (March 12,
1971).
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nation of prospective jurors to trial judges rather than counsel,
thereby reducing the time devoted to voir dire. 15 Nevertheless, an
eleven-county study in New York (which retains attorney conducted voir dire) found that the average voir dire consumed 12.7
hours and 40 percent of the time devoted to trial.'"
In examining prospective jurors, lawyers and judges probe
their private attitudes and practices-asking, for example, about
the jurors' religious beliefs, drinking habits, jobs, hobbies, and
prior experience with lawyers, then asking about their relatives'
jobs, experiences as crime victims, and arrest records as well. 17 A
recent Connecticut decision illustrated how far some judges believe
that lawyers must be allowed to carry the process; the court reversed a defendant's conviction of stealing a family's Christmas
gifts because the trial judge had refused to permit questions concerning the prospective jurors' "attitude toward Christmas."' 8
Lawyers' queries frequently are designed not to gain information but to make a point. For example, California defense attorneys sometimes ask before trial whether the defendant is guilty or
innocent, expecting the honest answer, "I don't know." The lawyers then challenge the hapless juror who gave this answer on the
ground that he or she departed from the presumption of innocence; the lawyers hope to impress other jurors with the importance of the presumption even if the challenge is disallowed.' 9
Every question asked during voir dire becomes part of a process
that some thoughtful trial practitioners regard as scandalous; 0 and
although no single question may seem burdensome, it is appropri15

See V. Hale Starr and Mark McCormick, Jury Selection: An Attorney's Guide to

Jury Law and Methods 39-40 (Little, Brown, 1985) (in thirteen states the judge alone conducts the voir dire examination; in eighteen states attorneys are primarily responsible for
conducting this examination; in nineteen states the attorneys and judge share the examination; and 75 percent of federal judges permit no oral participation of counsel in the voir dire
examination). For evidence that conduct of the voir dire examination by judges substantially reduces the time devoted to jury selection, see William H. Levit et al, Expediting Voir
Dire: An EmpiricalStudy, 44 S Cal L Rev 916, 949 (1971); Note, Judge Conducted Voir
Dire as a Time-Saving Trial Technique, 2 Rutgers-Camden L Rev 161, 184 (1970).
1 Chambers, Who Should Pick Jurors at B4 (cited in note 13). Most of the federal
judges who responded to a Federal Judicial Center survey estimated, however, that a "typical" voir dire consumed one hour or less. Gordon Bermant, Conduct of the Voir Dire Examination: Practicesand Opinions of Federal District Judges 13 (Fed Judicial Center, 1977).
17 See, for example, Ward Wagner, Jr., Art of Advocacy: Jury Selection MQ 4-50 (Matthew Bender, 1988) (suggesting model questions for attorneys to ask on voir dire).
18 State v Barnes, 16 Conn App 333, 547 A2d 584, 588 (1988).
As, incredibly, it may not be. See Charles R. Garry, Minimizing Racism in Jury Trials 85 (National Lawyers Guild, 1969).
"0See Edward Bennett Williams, Jury Selection-One Day Is Enough, 17 Student
Lawyer J 24 (Oct 1971).
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ate to consider whether the benefits of asking this question exceed
the costs.
Turner v Murray,2 1 decided by the Supreme Court in 1986,
was a capital case in which the defendant asked the trial judge to
submit the following question to prospective jurors:
The defendant, Willie Lloyd Turner, is a member of the Negro race. The victim, W. Jack Smith, Jr., was a white Caucasian. Will those facts prejudice you against Willie Lloyd Turner or affect your ability to render a fair and impartial verdict
based solely on the evidence?"
The trial judge declined to ask this question. He did ask the prospective jurors whether they knew of any reason why they could
not render a fair and impartial verdict. All the jurors responded
44no.-23
Prior to Turner, the Supreme Court had held that a refusal to
question prospective jurors about possible racial prejudice violated
the Due Process Clause when the defendant was a black civil rights
worker charged with a drug offense. 4 It also had held that the
omission of questions concerning racial prejudice was permissible
when a black defendant was charged with robbing, assaulting, and
attempting to murder a white security guard. 5 In Turner, the
Court ruled that the trial judge's refusal to inquire about possible
racial prejudice violated the defendant's right to an impartial jury
at the penalty phase of his capital trial. The Court vacated the
defendant's death sentence while affirming his conviction of
murder. 6
Blacks who kill whites are sentenced to death with disproportionate frequency-a fact that the Supreme Court held in McCles28
key v Kemp 27 does not render their execution unconstitutional.
21
22
23
24

476 US 28 (1986).

Id at 30-31.
Id at 31.
Ham v South Carolina,409 US 524 (1973).
v Ross, 424 US 589 (1976). To discern any distinction between Ham and

25 Ristaino

Ristaino, one must have the legal mind. But see id at 596-97 (claiming that because Ham's
defense was that he was being framed on account of his civil rights activity, "[r]acial issues.
* were inextricably bound up with the conduct of the trial" and concluding that "the circumstances ... did not suggest a significant likelihood that racial prejudice might infect
Ross's trial.").
26 476 US at 37-38.
27 481 US 279 (1987).
28 The apparent racial disparity in the imposition of capital punishment cannot be explained by relevant differences in the circumstances of the cases. See id at 354-59 (Blackmun dissenting). The decisions of prosecutors cause this disparity far more than the deci-
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Any procedure that offered even a marginal prospect of reducing
this maladministration of the death penalty would have a strong
claim to support. 29 It is nevertheless appropriate to examine the
way in which the decision in Turner encourages people to think of
one another and the attitude toward juries that it expresses.
In Turner, the Supreme Court did not require an extended
examination of prospective jurors to discover hidden or unrecognized biases. The defendant apparently was entitled only to a single question propounded to the entire jury panel.30 Although the
Supreme Court described this procedure as "minimally intrusive,''sl it also seems minimally useful. One doubts that Lester
Maddox, Orville Faubus, George Wallace, Theodore Bilbo or anyone else would have responded to the proposed question by confessing a bias likely to affect his or her resolution of a capital murder case. The function of the question, as of most of the questions
that lawyers ask during voir dire, was to indoctrinate.3 2 Its purpose
was to admonish the jurors, reminding them of their responsibili-

sions of juries. See id at 350-51; McCleskey v Zant, 580 F Supp 338, 367 (Table 3), 368-69
(ND Ga 1984), aff'd as McCleskey v Kemp, 753 F2d 877 (11th Cir 1985), aft'd, 481 US 279
(1987).
29 Whether the Sixth Amendment would require this procedure is a somewhat different
question. One week after its decision in Turner, the Supreme Court apparently held that
even an arbitrary exclusion of people from jury service on the basis of their viewpoint, politics, or ideology would not violate the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of trial by an impartial
jury. It would be enough that the people who remained on the jury could be expected to
"'conscientiously apply the law and find the facts.'" Lockhart v McCree, 476 US 162, 178
(1986) (quoting Wainwright v Witt, 469 US 412, 423 (1985)). In a case in which the Court
found substantial justification for the challenged exclusion, the suggestion that the exclusion
for cause of, say, all opponents of aid to the Contras would not violate the Sixth Amendment was an astonishing bit of overkill. In Turner, however, there was no reason to doubt
that the defendant had been tried by an impartial jury of the kind that Lockhart required-one that had "conscientiously appl[ied] the law and [found] the facts." Four members of the jury were black, and one of them served as the jury's foreman. Turner, 476 US at
49 (Powell dissenting). See also Ross v Oklahoma, 108 S Ct 2273, 2276-77 (1988) ("Any
claim that the jury was not impartial ... must focus not on [a potential juror who was
excluded] but on the jurors who ultimately sat.").
1o The Court declared, "[T]he trial judge retains discretion as to the form and number
of questions on the subject, including the decision whether to question the venire individually or collectively." 476 US at 37. See also id at 39 (Brennan dissenting) ("I, like the Court,
am influenced by what the Court correctly describes as the 'ease' with which the risk may be
minimized."); Ham v South Carolina, 409 US at 527 ("[E]ither of the brief, general questions urged by the petitioner would appear sufficient to focus the attention of prospective
jurors on any racial prejudice they might entertain.").
11 Turner, 476 US at 37.
31 See Dale W. Broeder, Voir Dire Examinations:An Empirical Study, 38 S Cal L Rev
503, 522 (1965) ("Conservatively, about eighty per cent of the lawyers' voir dire time was
spent indoctrinating, only twenty per cent in sifting out the favorable from the unfavorable
veniremen .... [Nevertheless, i]ndoctrination did not often appear to succeed.").
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ties, and in effect to begin the trial before the trial began. 3
Had I represented the State of Virginia in Turner, I would
have been tempted to begin my oral argument before the Supreme
Court with a question:
May it please the Court, the petitioner in this case, Willie
Lloyd Turner, is a member of the Negro race. The victim, W.
Jack Smith, Jr., was a white Caucasian. Chief Justice Burger
and members of the Court, will those facts prejudice you
against Willie Lloyd Turner or affect your ability to render a
fair and impartial decision based solely on the law?
Resisting the temptation, I-like any other courteous lawyer-would not in fact have addressed this question to the Justices
of the Supreme Court. Similarly, no lawyer would have asked it of
a Virginia trial judge. Indeed, no respectful adult would ask another adult in polite conversation, "Pardon me. Are you a bigot?"
Instead, the proposed question embodied a form of instruction
typically reserved for children:
We're good Americans, aren't we, boys and girls? We would
never judge a person on the basis of the color of his or her
skin, would we? If you were deciding whether to convict a person accused of murder and to give him or her a lethal injection for a very nasty crime, this person's color wouldn't matter
at all, would it?
The stakes were high enough in Turner that the defense attorney's
question might have been justified; but we have become so accustomed to thinking of jurors as children that we may fail to recognize how patronizing the question is.34
The decision in Turner manifests a pattern of condescension
toward jurors that appears in many of our practices and procedures. Although we invest jurors with important responsibilities,
we seat them at the side of the courtroom in an area vaguely resembling the Peanut Gallery on the Howdy Doody Show." We
33 See Susan E. Jones, Voir Dire and Jury Selection, 22 Trial 60, 66 (Sept 1986) ("If
you handle voir dire well, by the time you reach opening statement, you will be preaching to
the converted.").
Sometimes an admonition not to yield to prejudice or to do other things that one
knows one should not do might be useful and appreciated. Nevertheless, this sort of admonition should be exceptional, not routine. A respectful lawyer, for example, ordinarily would
not admonish a trial judge to follow the law rather than his or her own predilections however strongly the lawyer suspected that this judge was inclined to bend or break the rules.
35 In Germany, by contrast, where lay people serve with professional judges on mixed
tribunals, they sit at the head of the courtroom with the professional judges. See John H.

162
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usually do not permit jurors to ask questions, 6 and we do not permit them to explain their rulings. Like good children, good jurors
are to be seen and not heard.
Even in white collar crime prosecutions so complex that lawyers bring computers to the courtroom to keep track of their evidence, jurors often are not permitted to take notes.3 7 A verdict apparently must be the product of atmospheric folk wisdom rather
than careful study and reflection. Much of our law of evidence (including its central rules regarding hearsay and character evidence)
rests on the proposition that the prejudicial impact of relevant information may outweigh its probative value-in other words, that
although judges and rulemakers can understand the limited worth
of this evidence, jurors who evaluate similarly fallible evidence in
their everyday lives cannot. In accordance with the attitude toward
jurors that our procedures commonly express, questions that would
seem rude in other social contexts suddenly may appear unobjectionable when asked of prospective jurors.
To be sure, we do not always treat jurors as children. At the
conclusion of the trial, we ask them to master legal concepts that,
despite my best efforts, some of my students fail to grasp at the
end of a lengthy course on criminal law. Consider this 110-word
sentence from a "model" jury instruction included in the leading
New York treatise on the subject:
To constitute a larceny, there must be an act that indicates
the defendant's intention to obtain the property from its
rightful owner by bringing about the transfer of the property
or a legal interest in it to himself or to another person and to
appropriate it to himself or to another person by exercising
control over it or aiding a third party to exercise control over
it permanently or for such an extended period of time or
under such circumstances as to deprive its owner of the economic value or benefit of the property or to dispose of the
property for himself or for the benefit of a third person.3 8
Langbein, Comparative Criminal Procedure:Germany 63 (West, 1977).
36 See Comment, The Questioning of Witnesses by Jurors, 27 Am U L Rev 127, 132
(1977); Annotation, Proprietyof Jurors Asking Questions in Open Court During Course of
Trial, 31 ALR3d 872 (1970).
"I See, for example, State v Johnson, 632 SW2d 43, 45 (Mo App 1982); Commonwealth
v Pierce, 453 Pa 319, 309 A2d 371, 372 (1973); State v Groves, 311 S2d 230, 239 (La 1975),
overruled on other grounds, State v Lee, 331 S2d 455 (La 1977); Annotation, Taking and
Use of Trial Notes by Jury, 14 ALR3d 831, 838 (1967). A substantial number of courts,
however, do permit note taking by jurors. See Annotation, 14 ALR3d at 834.
Budd G. Goodman and Howard G. Leventhal, 2 Charges to the Jury and Requests to
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Defenders of the jury system maintain that the process of explaining legal propositions to lay people helps to keep the law comprehensible, 9 yet studies suggesting that jurors fail to understand half
the instructions they receive4" do not always reflect badly on the
jurors themselves. 1 Jurors are not children; but with rare exceptions, neither are they legal scholars.
III. THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
Not only have we patronized jurors by treating them as children before and during trial; we also have insulted jurors by discriminating against them on racial and other invidious grounds. In
Swain v Alabama,'2 an all-white jury in Talledega County, Alabama, convicted a nineteen-year-old black man of raping a seventeen-year-old white woman and sentenced him to death. Since at
least 1950, no black had served on a civil or criminal jury in Talledega County, and the prosecutor in Swain used six peremptory
challenges to remove from the jury panel the only six blacks eligible to serve.'3
In an opinion by Justice White, the Supreme Court affirmed
the defendant's conviction and sentence. The Court distinguished
between striking blacks in order to improve the prosecutor's likeliCharge in a Criminal Case § 43:03 at 222 (Callaghan, 1983) (emphasis in the original).
31 See, for example, Toni M. Massaro, Peremptories or Peers?-Rethinking Sixth
Amendment Doctrine, Images, and Procedures, 64 NC L Rev 501, 514 (1986).
40 See, for example, Amiram Elwork, Bruce D. Sales, and James J. Alfini, Making Jury
Instructions Understandable(Cambridge, 1982); Reid Hastie, Steven D. Penrod, and Nancy
Pennington, Inside the Jury 80, 231 (Harvard, 1983); Robert P. Charrow and Veda R. Charrow, Making Legal Language Understandable:A PsycholinguisticStudy of Jury Instructions, 79 Colum L Rev 1306, 1308-09 & n 8 (1979); William W. Schwarzer, Communicating
with Juries: Problems and Remedies, 69 Cal L Rev 731, 740-43 (1981); Laurence J. Severance and Elizabeth F. Loftus, Improving the Ability of Jurors to Comprehend and Apply
Criminal Jury Instructions, 17 L & Soc'y Rev 153 (1982).
41 Although much could be done to improve the comprehensibility of jury instructions,
the problem of juror misunderstanding would be likely to persist. This misunderstanding
probably stems more from the need to deliver a barrage of instructions on every legal issue
potentially presented by various combinations of permissible factual findings than from the
phrasing of particular instructions. In at least some cases, instructions may contain too
much law for even capable and conscientious listeners to master. In accordance with our
pattern of seeking mystic reassurance from juries rather than carefully considered judgments, jurors often are not permitted to consult written copies of the court's instructions
during their deliberations. See, for example, United States v Conley, 503 F2d 520, 522 (8th
Cir 1974); Martin v State, 260 Ind 490, 495-96, 296 NE2d 793, 797 (1973). This restriction,
however, has been abandoned by a substantial and increasing number of courts. See, for
example, United States v Clavey, 565 F2d 111, 119 (7th Cir 1977) (allowing the jury to
consult written instructions was not an abuse of the trial court's discretion).
42 380 US 202 (1965).
41 Id at 205.
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hood of success at trial and striking them "for reasons wholly unrelated to the outcome of the particular case... [simply] to deny the
Negro the same right and opportunity to participate in the administration of justice enjoyed by the white population.""' The Court
recognized that, in the absence of tactical, trial-related objectives,
the use of peremptory challenges to exclude blacks would be unconstitutional.4 5 The Court held, however, that the prosecutor's exclusion of all potential black jurors in a single case could not establish the proscribed motivation. Moreover, the Court concluded that
the evidence before it failed to establish that the prosecutor was
responsible for the exclusion of blacks in cases other than Swain.4 6
In places like Talledega County, the regime of peremptory
challenges upheld in Swain reduced the requirement of nondiscrimination at earlier stages of the jury selection process to a mere
symbol. Although, in a reaffirmation of democratic values, blacks
and whites might be seated together on a panel of prospective jurors, a prosecutor could lawfully cause the blacks to disappear.
Under Swain, the Constitution guaranteed minorities only an opportunity to reach the finals before a government officer discriminated against them.
Twenty-five years before Swain, the Supreme Court had said,
"It is part of the established tradition in the use of juries as instruments of public justice that the jury be a body truly representative
of the community. '47 Nevertheless, Anglo-American juries long
have been far less democratic than this rhetoric suggests. In eighteenth century Staffordshire, for example, three-quarters of the
adult male population were insufficiently wealthy to meet the

44

Id at 224.

45 Id at 203-04.
48 The Court said that the "presumption protecting the prosecutor" might well be over-

come if "the prosecutor . . . in case after case, whatever the circumstances, whatever the
crime and whoever the defendant or the victim may be, is responsible for the removal of
Negroes who have been selected as qualified jurors .... with the result that no Negroes ever
serve on petit juries ... ." Id at 223-24. The frequency of the prosecutor's racially based
exclusions was relevant under Swain only because it might supply proof of improper motivation, not because frequency itself determined the legality of the prosecutor's actions. As
Justice White accurately observed in his concurring opinion in Batson v Kentucky, 476 US
79, 101 n * (1986), it would not have been "inconsistent with Swain for the trial judge to
invalidate peremptory challenges of blacks if the prosecutor, in response to an objection to
his strikes, stated that he struck blacks because he believed they were not qualified to serve
as jurors . . "
47 Smith v Texas, 311 US 128, 130 (1940). But see Lockhart v McCree, 476 US 162, 174
(1986) (disregarding the language of Smith-and of the Sixth Amendment-and holding
that the fair-cross-section requirement imposed by the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial
does not extend to the jury but only to the panel from which the jury is selected).
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property qualification for jury service."8 Similarly, in eighteenth
century Essex, only about 8 to 10 percent of the nonexempt heads
of households qualified to serve on juries.'
During most of the history of the common law, peremptory
challenges could at most have determined which members of a reasonably elite group of propertied men served on juries; and despite
the very early origins of the peremptory challenge, 50 challenges appear to have been rarely exercised in all of the periods of English
history in which scholars have examined the question5-so rarely
that some scholars have concluded that challenges were simply un-

" Douglas Hay, The Class Composition of the Palladium of Liberty: Trial Jurors in
the Eighteenth Century, in Cockburn and Green, eds, Twelve Good Men and True at 305,
349, 357 (cited in note 3) ("Class Composition"). Only 2 percent of the people accused of
crime (and none of the people charged with felony or theft) would have been eligible for jury
service. Id at 350-51 (sample of all 181 defendants tried in Staffordshire in a single year).
"' See King, "IlliteratePlebeians,Easily Misled" at 261 (cited in note 3). Women, men
over 70, peers, some apothecaries, some surgeons, registered seaman, some clerics and several other groups were either excluded or exempted from jury service. Hay, Class Composition at 321 (cited in note 48). The courts' power to empanel "talesmen" when an insufficient
number of regularly qualified jurors were available raises the possibility that juries were
more democratic than the "law on the books" concerning property qualifications suggested.
The studies by King and Hay cited in this and the preceding footnote, however, reveal a
close adherence to statutory requirements and an infrequent use of talesmen. Statutory
qualifications for jury service were less demanding than those for serving as a justice of the
peace, sitting in the House of Commons, or hunting game, however. See Hay, Class Composition at 349 (cited in note 48). In the context of the times, the English jury was a reasonably democratic institution.
50 See Batson v Kentucky, 476 US 79, 118-20 (1986) (Burger dissenting).
'1 I suspect that the defendant's right to challenge prospective jurors was once a hybrid; the early challenge combined what we would today regard as the challenge for cause
and the peremptory challenge. The self-informing jury was drawn from a small community,
and personal enemies of the defendant were, in our terms, disqualified for cause. To conduct
hearings on the issue of personal malice, however, would have been wasteful. When a defendant alleged malice on the part of a juror, the simplest course was to substitute another
juror. The defendant thus assigned cause for every exclusion, but the court accepted the
defendant's declaration as conclusive. Although the defendant's challenge was "for cause," it
was also "peremptory." On this view, the early peremptory challenge manifested no faith in
the defendant's ability to detect biased jurors through hunch or intuition; the peremptory
challenge was simply an economical means of accomplishing objectives that we now pursue
by permitting challenges for cause. See Henri Bracton, 2 On the Laws and Customs of England 405 (Harvard, 1968) (Samuel E. Thorne translation) ("[L]et the justice inform the
indicted man that if he suspects any of the twelve jurors he may remove them for just cause,
and let the same be said of the [jurors of] the vills, as where there are deadly enmities
between some of them and the indicted man... ; if there is ground for suspicion all are to
be removed, that the inquiry may proceed free of all doubts.").
Thomas A. Green, who knows much more about the early jury than I do (and probably
as much as anyone does), agrees that my speculation concerning the hybrid nature of the
early challenge is plausible but knows of no source that might confirm it. Telephone interview, Nov 15, 1988. If my surmise is accurate, the judges who created the challenge might be
surprised to learn of the tactical games that it now enables professional advocates to play.
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available in ordinary criminal cases. 2
The use of peremptory challenges has remained infrequent in
modern England. A 1979 study of English criminal trials reported,
"[T]he right of challenge was exercised [by either the defense or
the prosecution 53 ] in no more than one trial in seven, and only exceptionally was there more than a single challenge in a case."'54 The
relative homogeneity of English society may largely explain why
peremptory challenges have been less used in England than in
America, but there have been other reasons as well. The number of
peremptory challenges allowed the defense has declined substantially over the course of English history and was finally lowered to
three in 1977. Nonunanimous, ten-to-two jury verdicts are permitted. Property qualifications persisted until 1972, and these requirements effectively excluded most women from jury service.5 5 Moreover, a study of Birmingham juries indicated that nonrandom jury
selection by court officials contributed to a continuing underrepresentation of women and minorities after 1972.56 Finally, even
the limited and infrequently utilized voir dire examination that
counsel historically had been allowed was abolished in 1973. 57
In the United States, as broadened standards of eligibility for
52 An examination of late fourteenth century English jury records by J. B. Post uncovered no trace of the peremptory challenge at all. Post reported that, apart from people on
the jury list who failed to appear, the first twelve people on the list almost invariably were
empaneled. He concluded that, despite "the received opinion of the lawyers," challenges
were not available in ordinary criminal cases. J. B. Post, Jury Lists and Juries in the Late
Fourteenth Century, in Cockburn and Green, Twelve Good Men and True at 71 (cited in
note 3). Thomas A. Green noted the similar rarity of peremptory challenges throughout the
early history of the jury trial. In Green's view, the fact that defendants and jurors came
from different social classes and ordinarily did not know one another could not entirely
explain the absence of peremptory challenges. He concluded that defendants either were
unaware of the challenges authorized by law or were discouraged from exercising them.
Thomas Andrew Green, Verdict According to Conscience: Perspectives on the English
Criminal Trial Jury 1200-1800 133-34 (Chicago, 1985). A study of the eighteenth century
English jury reported that the right of challenge was "rarely used" in this period as well.
King, "IlliteratePlebeians, Easily Misled" at 277 (cited in note 3).
"' As a formal matter, English procedure affords only the defendant a right to challenge
prospective jurors peremptorily. In practice, however, the Crown's power to ask prospective
jurors to "stand by" affords the Crown a broader power to exclude prospective jurors than
the peremptory challenge gives the defendant. See Graham Hughes, English Criminal Justice: Is It Better Than Ours?, 26 Ariz L Rev 507, 593-94 (1984).
" John Baldwin and Michael McConville, Jury Trials 92-93 n 15 (Oxford, 1979). See
also Hughes, 26 Ariz L Rev at 593 n 399 (cited in note 53) (describing the similar findings of
the Morris Committee on Juries but indicating a more frequent use of the peremptory challenge in London).
" Hughes, 26 Ariz L Rev at 591 (cited in note 53).
" Baldwin and McConville, Jury Trials at 97-98 (cited in note 54).
'7 For a description of all of these developments and useful citations, see Hughes, 26
Ariz L Rev at 591-95 (cited in note 53).
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jury service manifested democratic faith in the popular administration of justice, the peremptory challenge manifested countervailing
doubt, mistrust, and ambivalence. The persistence of the challenge
typically ensured that a jury would not reflect a fair cross section
of the community or include too many of a defendant's peers. Although less sweeping than the formal statutory disqualifications
that legislatures had abandoned and that courts had held unconstitutional, the peremptory challenge was in some ways more troublesome. This challenge could be exercised on any ground, including
one that a legislature would not approve or a court uphold. Lawyers could use a power delegated by government to do in one case
after another what the government could not do uniformly. Moreover, unlike a statutory disqualification, the peremptory challenge
not only identified the people whom it disqualified but also made
them aware of their exclusion. In places like Talledega County, it
might have been kinder to save blacks the trouble of showing up.
The years following the decision in Swain v Alabama witnessed a concerted national effort to eliminate racial discrimination from most aspects of American life; and by 1986, the truly
unrestricted, truly peremptory challenge apparently had become
the last bastion of undisguised racial discrimination in the criminal
justice system. The Supreme Court's opinion in Batson v Kentucky 58 began by announcing that the Court would "reexamine
that portion of Swain v. Alabama . . .concerning the evidentiary
burden placed on a criminal defendant who claims that he has
been denied equal protection through the State's use of peremptory challenges to exclude members of his race from the petit
jury."59 Justice Powell's opinion for the Court concluded:
Although a prosecutor ordinarily is entitled to exercise permitted peremptory challenges "for any reason at all, as long as
that reason is related to his view concerning the outcome" of
the case to be tried,... the Equal Protection Clause forbids
the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account
of their race or on the assumption that black jurors as a group
will be unable impartially to consider the State's case against
a black defendant."
The Court characterized the issue in Batson merely as one of
58476 US 79 (1986).
59 Id at 82.
" Id at 89 (quoting United States v Robinson, 421 F Supp 467, 473 (D Conn 1976),
mandamus granted sub nom United States v Newman, 549 F2d 240 (2d Cir 1977)).
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the "evidentiary burden" that a defendant must assume to establish a prosecutor's discriminatory purpose, ruling that proof of a
pattern of exclusion extending over more than one case was no
longer necessary." This characterization of the issue, however, was
misleading. The Batson decision not only overruled Swain on an
issue of proof but also (and more importantly) altered what a defendant was required to prove. The Court rejected the Swain opinion's limited concept of impermissible purpose and held that a
prosecutor could violate the Equal Protection Clause by excluding
blacks for trial-related reasons. 2 A desire to deny minorities a
voice in the administration of criminal justice whatever the circumstances of the case was no longer the sine qua non of a constitutional violation. Batson revised not simply the means of proving
an improper purpose but the concept of discriminatory purpose
itself.
The Court's characterization of the issue in Batson was misleading in a second respect as well. The Court described the motivations of prosecutors in a way that insulted them and exhibited
an apparent misunderstanding of the litigation process. A prosecutor who peremptorily excludes blacks from a jury usually does not
act "on the assumption that black jurors as a group will be unable
impartially to consider the State's case against a black defendant"6 3 or, as the Court later put it, on "the assumption that [black
jurors] will be biased in a particular case simply because the defendant is black. 8 4 A prosecutor ordinarily might explain his or
her use of race as a predictor by saying:
I do not doubt that black jurors can fairly try a case against a
black defendant. My goal, however, is to secure a jury that
will prove as receptive to the state's case as possible. I must
exercise my peremptory challenges on the basis of limited information; and my experience has been that, although both
blacks and whites are generally fair-minded and conscientious, whites tend to be more favorable to the state's position
in this sort of case than blacks.
Read literally, Batson might not preclude racially grounded
challenges by a prosecutor who could honestly make this statement; this prosecutor would not believe that black jurors are "bi"
82
"
04

Id at 82, 96.
Id at 100. See also id at 134-37 (Rehnquist dissenting).
Id at 89.

Id at 97.
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ased" or "unable impartially to consider the State's case" simply
because these jurors share the defendant's race. The goal of this
prosecutor, as of most trial lawyers, would be to obtain a favorable
rather than an unbiased jury. Nevertheless, this prosecutor's motivation is undoubtedly among those that the Court meant to
condemn. 5
Although Batson brought to an end the Supreme Court's formal approval of some racial discrimination by prosecutors, the
Court limited the peremptory challenge only narrowly. Restricting
inquiry into a prosecutor's motives both procedurally and substantively, the Court created what William Pizzi has called an "enforcement nightmare."6 6 In addition, the Court posed issues whose
resolution may require the judiciary to draw lines every bit as ugly
and invidious as those that the Court condemned.
A review of seven issues that Batson left open will reveal the
substantial economic and human costs that the decision imposes
and the limited gain that it may yield. In the end, there appears to
be no escape from a conclusion that Justice Marshall reached in a
concurring opinion in Batson,67 that Chief Justice Burger voiced in
a dissenting opinion, 8 and that the Supreme Court itself apparently had accepted in Swain:"' Applying the Equal Protection
Clause to the jury selection process in the same way that the Court
has applied it to other governmental activities would abolish the
peremptory challenge altogether.
Although Chief Justice Burger and the Court in Swain saw the
value of preserving peremptory challenges as a reason for limiting
the reach of the Equal Protection Clause, they failed to put first

"' The Court's misleading description of the motivation of prosecutors who exclude
blacks for trial-related reasons facilitated its condemnation of this motivation. A belief that
black jurors "will be biased in a particular case simply because the defendant is black"
would be false and would manifest racial bigotry. Nevertheless, just as blacks and whites
may favor Jesse Jackson for President in different ratios, blacks and whites may-if regarded collectively and statistically-approach the issues that arise in some criminal cases
differently. See Katherine Goldwasser, Limiting a Defendant's Use of Peremptory Challenges, 102 Harv L Rev 808, 834-35 n 165 (1989) (collecting sources). The Supreme Court
did not suggest that a prosecutor who considered race an empirically significant predictor
would be personally biased or even wrong. In Batson, the Court directed prosecutors to act
in a way that may in fact diminish their ability to win their cases-a circumstance that
bears on the likelihood that they will exploit the loopholes that the opinion affords.
46 William T. Pizzi, Batson v Kentucky: Curing the Disease but Killing the Patient,
1987 S Ct Rev 97, 134.
67 476 US at 107-08 (Marshall concurring).
68 Id at 123-28 (Burger dissenting). This portion of Chief Justice Burger's opinion is
discussed in text at notes 178-82.
"' See 380 US at 221-22.
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principles first. Peremptory challenges ensure the selection of jurors on the basis of insulting stereotypes without substantially advancing the goal of making juries more impartial. The Equal Protection Clause forbids the arbitrary classification of human beings,
and peremptory challenges are inherently arbitrary. Even when exercised on grounds other than race, these challenges are
unconstitutional. °
A.

Prima Facie Proof of Discriminatory Purpose

Batson established a two-stage procedure for evaluating claims
of discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges. A defendant
must "establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination"
before the burden shifts to the prosecutor to "come forward with a
neutral explanation for challenging black jurors. 71 The Court said
that "the trial court should consider all relevant circumstances" in
deciding whether a prima facie case has been shown, adding that
the prosecutor's statements during the examination of prospective
jurors might support "an inference of discriminatory purpose."7 2 A
prosecutor usually fails to provide verbal hints of a discriminatory
goal, however, and the Court did not indicate how many blacks
this prosecutor might strike in an ordinary case before his or her
actions would exhibit an apparent pattern of discrimination requiring explanation.
In other contexts, the Court has suggested that a prima facie
case requires proof of a statistically significant disparity between
the number of minorities selected by an actor and the number that
a random process would have been expected to produce.7 3 Nevertheless, the "expected" number of minorities on a twelve-person

70

For more rigorous analysis of this issue, see text at notes 173-99. Although, from his

own perspective, a prosecutor may have a rational basis for striking black prospective jurors
(see note 63 and accompanying text), a rational basis is insufficient to support an invidious
racial classification. See, for example, Loving v Virginia, 388 US 1, 8-9 (1967). Moreover, the
issue is whether the prosecutor's classification adequately advances a public or governmental interest, not whether it advances the prosecutor's own interest in victory at trial. In
other words, the issue is whether-in a system in which potential jurors who exhibit partiality are subject to challenge for cause-a prosecutor's gamesmanship in removing jurors who
do not exhibit this partiality coupled with similar gamesmanship on the part of his opponent yields a better jury.
71 See 476 US at 96-97.
72 Id.
73 See, for example, Castaneda v Partida,430 US 482, 496-97 n 17 (1977) ("As a general rule for ... large samples, if the difference between the expected value and the observed
value is greater than two or three standard deviations, then the hypothesis that the jury

drawing was random would be suspect to a social scientist.").
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jury is so small in most jurisdictions that even when no minorities
in fact serve on a jury this circumstance cannot establish a statistically significant disparity. The Supreme Court emphasized in Batson that prima facie proof does not require evidence of discrimination extending over more than one case.74 Rather than focus on the
final composition of the jury, a court might consider the likelihood
that a prosecutor's peremptory challenges would have excluded the
number of minorities that they did exclude if these challenges had
been exercised by lot. This approach might permit the development of useful statistical proof, but the Supreme Court did not
explore this possibility. In essence, the Court's requirement of a
prima facie case left lower court judges at large to determine when
"things look bad."
Some courts have held that a prosecutor's exclusion of the
only two7 5 or even the only three" minorities on a jury panel does
not establish a prima facie case of discrimination. 77 Courts also
have concluded that when a prosecutor fails to challenge all the
potential minority jurors whom he or she might, the number whom
he or she may challenge without explanation increases. 78 Indeed,
language in Justice White's concurring opinion in Batson-language that probably should not be read literally-suggests
that so long as a prosecutor allows even one black whom he or she
might have challenged to serve on a jury, the exclusion of all other
blacks is constitutional. 9

74 476

US at 95-96.
" See, for example, United States v Vaccaro, 816 F2d 443, 457 (9th Cir 1987); People v
Rousseau, 129 Cal App 3d 526, 536-37, 179 Cal Rptr 892, 897-98 (1982) (interpreting People
v Wheeler, 22 Cal3d 258, 148 Cal Rptr 890 (1978), a decision similar to Batson).
7' See Commonwealth v Robinson, 382 Mass 189, 415 NE2d 805, 809-10 (1981) (prosecuter struck three of the four minority group members of a jury panel peremptorily and the
remaining minority for cause-no prima facie case under Commonwealth v Soares, 377
Mass 461, 387 NE2d 499 (1979), a ruling similar to Batson).
7'But see Mitchell v State, 295 Ark 341, 750 SW2d 936, 940 (1988), and Stanley v
State, 313 Md 50, 542 A2d 1267, 1283-1285 (Md Ct App 1988), both of which held that the
exclusion of one minority group member is sufficient to establish a prima facie case when
this juror is the only member of the defendant's race on the panel of prospective jurors.
7sIn addition to the cases cited in note 79, see Note, Batson v. Kentucky and the
ProsecutorialPeremptory Challenge: Arbitrary and Capricious Equal Protection?,74 Va L
Rev 811, 821 & n 74 (1988).
79 Justice White described the motivation that Batson ruled impermissible as a "belief
that no black citizen could be a satisfactory juror or fairly try a black defendant," as "the
assumption that no black juror could fairly judge a black defendant," and as "the view that
all blacks should be eliminated from the entire venire." 476 US at 101 (White concurring). If
read literally, these statements suggest that a prosecutor's willingness to permit any black to
serve on a jury-for example, a black known to the prosecutor as a conservative, an opponent of affirmative action, and an advocate of increased criminal penalties-would permit
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The success or failure of the Batson decision may not depend
solely upon the ability of courts to detect and sanction
prosecutorial misbehavior. The Court in Swain told prosecutors
that they might lawfully exclude blacks from a jury for trial-related reasons; Batson informed them that this tactical exclusion
was no longer permissible. Because most prosecutors will probably
comply with the Supreme Court's decision in good faith, Batson
may work a significant change in American trial practice.8 0 I suspect in fact that it has.
Nevertheless, some prosecutors may seek to evade the requirements of the Batson decision; and unlike the somewhat comparable requirement of prima facie proof in civil lawsuits alleging unlawful discrimination, the requirement of a prima facie case limits
a defendant's ability to discover the motives of a prosecutor suspected of discrimination. In a Title VII action or other civil lawsuit
alleging discrimination, the plaintiff may obtain pretrial discovery
from the defendant before attempting to present a prima facie case
at trial. Because a criminal defendant alleging discrimination in
the exercise of peremptory challenges has no comparable discovery
opportunity, the requirement of a prima facie case serves a
gatekeeping function not served by the seemingly comparable requirement in civil cases.-This procedural hurdle may offer substantial comfort to a prosecutor who wishes to continue pre-Batson

the prosecutor to exclude all other blacks. See State v Peck, 719 SW2d 553, 556 (Tenn Crim
App 1986) (no prima facie case because the prosecutor did not exclude "all members of
defendant's race"); United States v Montgomery, 819 F2d 847, 851 (8th Cir 1987) ("The
fact that the government accepted a jury which included two blacks, when it could have
used its remaining peremptory challenges to strike these potential jurors, shows that the
government did not attempt to exclude all blacks, or as many blacks as it could, from the
jury."); United States v Dennis, 804 F2d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir 1986) (prosecutor struck three
blacks and accepted two-no prima facie showing of discrimination); United States v
David, 662 F Supp 244, 246 (N D Ga 1987), aft'd, 844 F2d 767 (11th Cir 1988) (prosecutor
struck two of three blacks on the jury panel and one of two blacks on the alternate
panel-no prima facie showing of discrimination because "(1) the number of black persons
on the regular panel was small and (2) the prosecutor could have, but did not, strike all of
the black members of that panel"). But see Fleming v Kemp, 794 F2d 1478, 1483 (11th Cir
1986) ("nothing in Batson compels the . . .conclusion that constitutional guarantees are
never abridged if all black jurors but one or two are struck because of their race"); United
States v Battle, 836 F2d 1084, 1086 (8th Cir 1987) ("the striking of a single black juror for
racial reasons violates the Equal Protection Clause, even though other black jurors are
seated"); Stanley v State, 313 Md 50, 542 A2d 1267, 1278-79 (Md 1988) (prima facie case
established by prosecutor's use of eight of his ten peremptory challenges against blacks although three blacks served on the defendant's jury).
so But see Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Pathof the Law, 10 Harv L Rev 457, 459 (1897)
(arguing that law must be judged from the perspective of a bad man who wishes only to
evade it).
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patterns of discrimination. In every case, Batson may afford this
prosecutor one or two "free shots"-opportunities to discriminate
against blacks without accounting for his or her actions. When only
one or two blacks appear on the panel of prospective jurors, the
prosecutor may need no more ammunition. Moreover, whenever
the prosecutor holds his or her fire and allows one or two blacks to
serve on a jury, he or she may gain additional opportunities to
discriminate."1
B. Racially Neutral Explanation
When a defendant establishes a prima facie case of discrimination under Batson, a prosecutor may rebut it by "com[ing] forward
with a neutral explanation for challenging black jurors."8 2 Trial
courts must determine whether the reasons offered by prosecutors
are truthful, are sufficiently independent of race to qualify as
"neutral," and are otherwise satisfactory.s When these courts
81 The South Carolina Supreme Court has withheld "free shots" from South Carolina
prosecutors. It has urged trial courts to require prosecutors to supply reasons whenever they
exclude members of a defendant's race from a jury. State v Jones, 293 SC 54, 358 SE2d 701,
703 (1987). See also State o Holloway, 44 Crim L Rptr 2390 (Conn 1989) (grounding a
requirement that a prosecutor explain every exclusion of jurors of the same race as the
defendant on the court's "inherent supervisory authority over the administration of justice"). Although the South Carolina court's requirement seems broad enough to include
cases in which white defendants challenge the exclusion of prospective white jurors, one
doubts that the court will extend its requirement to these cases. Demanding a statement of
reasons for every peremptory challenge of a white juror when a case involves a white defendant and for every peremptory challenge of a black juror when a case involves a black defendant would come close to abolishing the peremptory challenge; there would be little reason
not to go the distance. Although the South Carolina procedure saves trial courts from one
burden-inquiry into the adequacy of preliminary showings of discrimination-it imposes
another. When a case involves a minority defendant, the court must record reasons for the
exclusion of every minority juror and must rule on the adequacy of these reasons. This
procedure-demanding that prosecutors explain every exclusion of blacks but no exclusion
of whites-may seem not only costly but patronizing. Still, the South Carolina procedure
appears preferable to that contemplated by Batson. In the end, any procedure that stops
short of demanding cause for every exclusion of blacks and whites is likely to substitute new
forms of discrimination for old.
8' 476 US at 97.
33 The Court said that "the prosecutor's explanation need not rise to the level justifying
exercise of a challenge for cause," 476 US at 97, that it must be "a 'clear and reasonably
specific' explanation of . . . 'legitimate reasons,'" id at 98 n 20 (quoting Texas Dept. of
Community Affairs v Burdine, 450 US 248, 258 (1981)), and that it must be "related to the
particular case to be tried." Id at 98. One wonders whether the last requirement was meant
to preclude prosecutors from using general selection criteria applicable to all cases. For example, a prosecutor attuned to courthouse folklore might explain his exclusion of a black
juror by saying, "I follow the 'P' rule. That is, I never accept a juror whose occupation
begins with the letter 'P,' and I struck this prospective juror because she is a plumber." The
prosecutor might be able to demonstrate the truthfulness of his statement by showing that
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prove too tolerant of prosecutorial explanations, appellate proceedings and retrials become necessary.
The requirement of a racially neutral explanation poses the
conundrums that a requirement of nondiscriminatory purpose always poses. Whether the presence of one neutral reason is sufficient, whether the prosecutor must have been wholly uninfluenced
by race, or whether the court must probe the prosecutor's psyche
deeply enough to determine how he or she would have treated a
white juror who exhibited similar characteristics is uncertain. 4
Judging whether the prosecutor would have treated a white juror
in the same way as a black juror could prove especially problematic
when, even apart from color, few whites would have been likely to
share some of the excluded juror's characteristics.8 5
in many past cases he consistently had excluded both black and white prospective jurors
whose occupations began with the letter "P." Under Batson, the fact that the prosecutor's
challenges were exercised on a racially neutral basis probably should justify them, but the
reason offered for the challenges seems neither "legitimate" nor "related to the particular
case to be tried." Noting the Court's observation that the prosecutor's statement of reasons
"need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause," Chief Justice Burger
protested, "I am at a loss to discern the governing principles here. A 'clear and reasonably
specific' explanation of 'legitimate reasons' for exercising the challenge will be difficult to
distinguish from a challenge for cause." Id at 127 (Burger dissenting). See State v Butler,
731 SW2d 265, 272 (Mo App 1987) (prosecutor explained that he rejected a prospective
juror because, as a nurse, she would tend to be "compassionate and thus inclined to feel
sorry for defendants"-explanation held inadequate); Williams v State, 507 NE2d 997, 999
(Ind App 1987) (prosecutor explained that he rejected a prospective juror because she was a
social worker and therefore "might have had a liberal view of sexual behavior" that would
affect her judgment in a rape case-explanation held adequate); Slappy v State, 503 S2d
350, 355 (Fla App 1987) (prosecutor explained that he rejected two prospective jurors because they were schoolteachers, a position indicating "liberalism"-explanation held inadequate); Chisolm v State, 529 S2d 635, 638 (Miss 1988)(prosecutor explained that he rejected
two prospective jurors because they were associated with radio and television stations that
had broadcast anti-law enforcement programs-explanation held adequate; Batson does not
preclude "absurd" challenges so long as they are not based on race).
I Some prosecutors have admitted mixed racial and nonracial motives. After excluding
the only four prospective black jurors in a robbery case, a federal prosecutor explained one
challenge by noting that the excluded juror had come to court in bluejeans, indicating to the
prosecutor the juror's lack of "respect for the system." The prosecutor added, "I thought
[this prospective juror] lived in the [defendant's] neighborhood-he's black, too.... and I
thought he might identify with him too much." Although the Ninth Circuit did not decide
whether this explanation justified the prosecutor's strike, it noted that some of the prosecutor's reasons seemed proper while one-the fear that the prospective juror's race would lead
him to identify with the defendant-was plainly improper. United States v Thompson, 827
F2d 1254, 1256 n 1, 1260 (9th Cir 1987).
85 A prosecutor in the District of Columbia once told me that he would not attempt to
exclude all blacks from a jury even in a jurisdiction other than his in which this effort might
not prove futile. "But I'll tell you this," the prosecutor added. "I won't let a street dude on
one of my juries." Were this prosecutor honestly to explain a peremptory challenge by declaring, "I did not strike this person because he's black; I struck him because he's a street
dude," some psychoanalysis might be necessary to determine the adequacy of his explana-
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Moreover, even if it could be determined that a prosecutor
probably would have excluded a white juror with a characteristic
like one that had led the prosecutor to exclude one or more blacks,
the characteristic might be such a close proxy for race that, in the
language of the Batson opinion, it would not supply a "neutral explanation for challenging black jurors." ' A prosecutor might explain a peremptory challenge by noting that the excluded black
juror lives in the same neighborhood as the defendant, lives in a
similar neighborhood, is economically disadvantaged, is unemployed, is of the same religious faith as the defendant, has failed to
finish high school, has been arrested, or is related to someone who
has been arrested. Prospective jurors who share the defendant's
race may share some of his or her other characteristics; and when
prosecutors have focused on these other characteristics, courts
often have upheld their peremptory strikes. 7
Finally, courts must determine what reasons for exclusion are
disingenuous or pretextual-a particularly difficult task when a
prosecutor relies on a juror's asserted mannerisms to justify an exclusion. A black who wishes to serve on a jury must be careful to
look directly at the prosecutor. The Fifth Circuit has upheld an
exclusion grounded primarily on a prospective juror's failure to
maintain eye contact. 8 The prospective juror must not look too
much, however. The Seventh Circuit has upheld an exclusion that
a prosecutor explained by saying, "Mr. Declinton [sic, Declinton
was the prospective juror's first name] was sitting directly to my
right, only a space of approximately four feet from me, and both
tion. The prosecutor might declare that most blacks are not street dudes and that some
whites are, but he might find it more difficult to affirm that his characterization was wholly
uninfluenced by the prospective juror's race. The prosecutor might admit in fact that he was
influenced in part by the prospective juror's hairstyle and manner of speech, characteristics
unlikely to be duplicated precisely in many white jurors. As Justice Marshall observed in his
concurring opinion in Batson, "Even ff all parties approach the Court's mandate with the
best of conscious intentions, that mandate requires them to confront and overcome their
own racism... -a challenge I doubt all of them can meet." 476 US at 106. For a discussion
of the difficulty of resolving the "counterfactual conditionals" posed by some concepts of
discriminatory purpose, see David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of
Brown, 56 U Chi L Rev (forthcoming, 1989).
"6 476 US at 97.

See, for example, United States v Cartlidge, 808 F2d 1064, 1070 (5th Cir 1987) (exclusion because prospective juror was "young, single, and unemployed" upheld); Taitano v
Commonwealth, 4 Va App 342, 358 SE2d 590, 592-93 (1987) (exclusion because prospective
jurors lived in the same neighborhood as the defendant or in "areas of 'high crime'" upheld). But see State v Gilmore, 103 NJ 508, 542-43, 511 A2d 1150, 1168 (1986) (exclusion
based on the assumption that prospective jurors, like the defendant, were Baptists held
invalid).
" Cartlidge, 808 F2d at 1071.
37
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yesterday and today he spent a very great deal of time in examining me in a way which I felt was in the end becoming rather
hostile." '
Courts have upheld exclusions grounded on a prospective juror's "posture and demeanor," 90 "poor attitude in answering voir
dire questions," 9 ' "nodding ... a little bit too much toward [defense counsel] and not enough towards me, '92 "demeanor and how
he answered the questions," 93 and even exuding "something [that]
seemed unfavorable." 94 The Supreme Court, however, may attempt
to limit the courts' toleration of possibly pretextual explanations
by prosecutors. It has accepted for review a capital case in which
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals upheld the exclusion of five
prospective black jurors, including one who was challenged only
because he had been an employee of the United States Postal Service for thirteen years. The prosecutor explained that she had not
"had very good luck with postal employees."9 5
Even when prosecutors are forthcoming, determining the adequacy of their explanations is a difficult and burdensome task, and
prosecutors may not always be forthcoming. For some prosecutors,
Batson's message may appear to be: When your quota of free shots
is exhausted, you must make up some plausible reasons.9 6
" United States v Mathews, 803 F2d 325, 331-32 (7th Cir 1986), rev'd on other
grounds, 108 S Ct 883 (1988).
90 United States v Forbes, 816 F2d 1006, 1010-11 (5th Cir 1987).
9' United States v Vaccaro, 816 F2d 443, 457 (9th Cir 1987).
" Chambers v State, 724 SW2d 440, 442 (Tex App 1987).
'3 People v Talley, 152 Ill App3d 971, 504 NE2d 1318, 1327 (1987).
Rodgers v State, 725 SW2d 477, 480-81 (Tex App 1987).
Tompkins v State, 1987 WL 906 (Tex Crim App) (unreleased slip opinion), cert
granted, 108 S Ct 1727 (1988). See also United States v David, 662 F Supp 244 (ND Ga
1987), aff'd, 844 F2d 767 (11th Cir 1988) (prosecutor explained his exclusion of a black juror
by saying that government employees tended to be naive-court upheld the exclusion on the
ground that because the number of potential black jurors was small and the prosecutor had
permitted one of them to serve, the defendant had not established a prima facie case of
discrimination).
"' William Pizzi's description of Branch v State, 526 S2d 605 (Ala Crim App 1986),
remanded for reconsideration in light of Alabama Supreme Court guidelines, 526 S2d 634
(Ala 1987), illustrates the danger that Batson may not change very much. The case also
offers further instruction to the prosecutor who seeks to evade Batson's requirements:
In Branch v State, the prosecutors at the trial of a black defendant charged with murder used six of their seven peremptory challenges to strike six of the seven blacks on
the venire. At a hearing challenging the use of the peremptories, the prosecution offered nonracial explanations for each of the six challenges. One juror was challenged
because he was a scientist and it was feared that his background would put too much
pressure on the prosecution. A second juror was challenged because he was similar in
age and appearance to the defendant and he might have had a relationship to a person
arrested in an unrelated criminal case several months earlier. The third juror was
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C. Remedying Improper Exclusion
Once a defendant establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the prosecutor apparently must explain all prior and all subsequent strikes of prospective black jurors. A court that finds any
of the prosecutor's explanations inadequate confronts a difficult issue of remedy. The Supreme Court said in Batson that it would
"express no view on whether it is more appropriate.., for the trial
court to discharge the venire and select a new jury from a panel
not previously associated with the case ... or to disallow the discriminatory challenges and resume selection with the improperly
challenged jurors reinstated on the venire .... -97 Neither alternative seems satisfactory.
A person excluded from a jury on grounds of race may not
have harbored any bias against the state before his or her exclusion. Following this exclusion, however, the potential juror may be
far from favorably disposed to the prosecutor.98 The restoration to
a jury of one or more victims of a prosecutor's discrimination may
deprive the public as well as the prosecutor of trial by an impartial

struck because she had been unemployed and had a kind of "dumbfounded or bewildered look on her face" as if uncertain about what she was supposed to do. The fourth
juror was struck because she was a single female about the same age as the defendant
and it was feared that she "might feel as though she were a sister... and have some
pity on the [defendant]." The fifth juror was struck because it was the prosecutor's
general experience that employees of the company where the juror worked had not
been attentive as jurors and some employees at the company were being investigated
for a variety of crimes. Finally, the sixth juror was struck because he was unkempt in
appearance and gruff in manner, which might place him at odds with other jurors. The
trial court found that the prosecution's reasons for its strikes were neutral and legitimate, and the appellate court affirmed, concluding that the trial court followed Batson
"with caution and sensitivity."
Pizzi, 1987 S Ct Rev at 136 (footnotes omitted) (cited in note 66).
In State v Jackson, 322 NC 251, 368 SE2d 838, 839 (1988), a prosecutor used four of
her five peremptory challenges to exclude blacks from a jury. She explained that one excluded juror was unemployed, had been a student counselor at Shaw University, and therefore had too "liberal a background"; that a second was a law student at the University of
North Carolina and had been taught by professors of "somewhat liberal views"; that a third
had a son about the same age as the defendant; and that a fourth was unemployed and
"appeared indifferent and hostile." Id at 839, 841. On appeal, the defense attorney apparently did not object to the prosecution's exclusion of the law student who had been taught
by liberal professors but did object to the other three exclusions. Although the prosecutor
had failed to challenged unemployed whites, the court held that her explanations reflected
"legitimate criteria in picking a jury." 368 SE2d at 841.
"' 476 US at 100 n 24.
08 Although neither the prosecutor's explanation for the prospective juror's exclusion
nor the court's ruling that this explanation was inadequate might have occurred within the
hearing of the juror, a person excluded from a jury and then restored might well infer the
situation.
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tribunal. This remedy also could create a difficult interpersonal situation for the juror, the prosecutor, and others in the courtroom.
Moreover, this remedy would be burdensome and costly. Following a person's exclusion from a jury, he or she ordinarily may
begin service as a juror in another case or go home. The defendant's prima facie showing of discrimination and the court's consideration of the adequacy of the prosecutor's reasons could follow
this juror's exclusion by a few hours, a few days, or conceivably
longer. A court might require every excluded juror of the same race
as the defendant to remain available in the courthouse throughout
the jury selection process on the chance that the prosecutor might
exceed his or her quota of "free shots" or say something ugly; but
this procedure obviously would be wasteful.
In light of the difficulties posed by efforts to restore improperly excluded jurors to a jury, the courts that have spoken to the
issue have chosen the alternative remedy mentioned in Batson,
dismissing the entire jury panel.9 9 Starting the jury selection process over, however, is costly to the public and the defendant. Moreover, this remedy may not always provide a strong incentive to refrain from discrimination. Indeed, in some situations, the remedy
might give the prosecutor a broader de facto peremptory challenge
than any provided by law. A prosecutor dissatisfied with an initial
panel of prospective jurors-perhaps because this panel contained
an unusual number of minorities-might seek to reduce the presence of minorities through the exercise of peremptory strikes.
Were these strikes upheld, the prosecutor would gain a victory;
and were they declared unlawful and the jury selection process begun anew, the prosecutor might regard this defeat as a greater victory still.
The prosecutor would have gained not only the exclusion of
the prospective jurors whom he or she wrongfully challenged but
also the exclusion of all other members of the panel. The prosecutor would in effect have been afforded a power to strike the entire
panel peremptorily. A remedy that would give a prosecutor this
power seems troublesome, however unlikely it is that many prosecutors would use it in so calculated a fashion. Both dismissing the
entire panel and reinstating excluded jurors are unsatisfactory
remedies. Abolishing the peremptory challenge and requiring a
prosecutor to present, outside the hearing of prospective jurors,

" See People v Wheeler, 22 Cal 3d 258, 282, 148 Chl Rptr 890, 906 (1978); State v
Gilmore, 103 NJ 508, 539, 511 A2d 1150, 1167 (1986); Riley v State, 496 A2d 997, 1013 (Del
1985).
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cause for every exclusion before it occurred would make the choice
between these remedies unnecessary.
D. Another License for Discrimination: The Substantial Representation of a Targeted Group on a Jury Even After Members of
this Group Have Been Excluded
A recent Missouri decision,' like an earlier ruling by the Second Circuit, 10 1 severely limited the ability of some defendants to
secure a remedy for discrimination in the jury selection process. In
the Missouri case, the prosecutor used all of her peremptory challenges to strike six prospective black jurors and one prospective
black alternate juror. Five blacks nevertheless escaped the net and
served on the jury that tried the defendant. Because the defendant
had been tried by a jury that included a substantial number of
members of his race, the court concluded that he had not been
"prejudiced" and lacked "standing to raise a Batson challenge.' 10 2
When nondiscriminatory jury selection yields a jury in which
members of a defendant's race are under-represented or unrepresented, nothing in the Constitution entitles the defendant to relief. 0 3 Declaring that the Constitution gives defendants no more
than the luck of the draw when luck goes against them but that
they are not entitled to colorblind luck when it would work in their
favor does not reflect the coherent application of any constitutional principle. The Missouri court apparently would require justification for a prosecutor's peremptory exclusions only when the
prosecutor exceeded his or her quota of "free shots" and also
brought the number of minority jurors below the number that a
system of proportional representation would have yielded. So long

10

State v Vincent, 755 SW2d 400 (Mo App 1988).

101 Roman v Abrams, 822 F2d 214, 229 (2d Cir 1987) (relying on a pre-Batson interpretation of the Sixth Amendment).
101 Vincent, 755 SW2d at 403. Similarly, in Roman, the Second Circuit concluded that
a prosecutor had offered only pretextual reasons for using peremptory challenges to remove
eight members of the defendant's race from a jury panel, leaving only three members of this
race on the jury. The court nevertheless denied relief, noting that the prosecutor's strikes
had not "reduce[d] the petit jury representatives of [the defendant's race] dramatically below the group's percentage in the venire or in the population of the community." 822 F2d at
229.
...See, for example, Virginia v Rives, 100 US 313, 322-23 (1880), overruled on other
grounds, Greenwood v Peacock, 384 US 808 (1966); Apodaca v Oregon, 406 US 404, 413
(1972). But see Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 Mich L Rev
1611, 1695-1708 (1985) (arguing that a black, Native American, or Hispanic defendant
should have a right to the inclusion of "racially similar" jurors on the tribunal that tries him
or her).
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as the "bottom line" satisfied the court, there might be no limit on
the prosecutor's power to discriminate.
E. Discrimination on Nonracial Bases
The prosecutor in a recent Fourth Circuit case offered his reasons for striking three prospective black jurors. Protesting that he
had not struck these jurors because they were black, he insisted
that he had eliminated them because they were women.'0 4
The Supreme Court said in Batson that to establish a prima
facie case of discrimination a defendant "must show that he is a
member of a cognizable racial group ...

and that the prosecutor

has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire
members of the defendant's race."' 10 5 This statement and other references to race in the Batson opinion do not resolve the legality of
peremptory challenges based on a prospective juror's gender. Issues of nonracial exclusion were not before the Court, and the
Court did not address them. Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit rejected the defendant's argument "that the Equal Protection Clause
compels us to extend Batson to peremptory challenges exercised
on the basis of gender." 06 Similarly, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court has announced its view that "Batson does not extend to gen'0 7
der-based discrimination.'

104 United States v Hamilton, 850 F2d 1038 (4th Cir 1988). The defendants in this case
were nine black men and five black women, and the government used seven of its eight
peremptory challenges to strike prospective black jurors. In explaining the exclusion of
three of these jurors, the prosecutor declared that he wanted more men on the jury because
he feared that the jury otherwise would be overly sympathetic to the women defendants. At
the time that the prosecutor challenged the three black women, only one man had been
seated.
105476 US at 96.
106 Hamilton, 850 F2d at 1042.
107State v Oliviera, 534 A2d 867, 870 (RI 1987). But see State v Gilmore, 103 NJ 508,
511 A2d 1150, 1159 n 3 (1986) (holding that the New Jersey Constitution precludes the exercise of peremptory challenges on the basis of religious principles, race, color, ancestry, national origin, sex, and possibly other grounds). Decisions like those described in text reflect
a mechanistic jurisprudence that has become increasingly common as the Supreme Court
has drafted its judicial opinions as though they were legislative codes. See my paper, Personal Failure, Institutional Failure, and the Sixth Amendment, 14 NYU Rev L & Soc
Change 149, 154 & n 15 (1986). A litigant asserting unconstitutional gender discrimination
in the jury selection process is entitled to a principled resolution of this claim. Because no
issue of gender discrimination was presented in Batson and because the Supreme Court did
not discuss the merits of this issue even in dictum, the burden of providing a reasoned
consideration of the litigant's claim must fall initially upon lower courts. When these courts
do not assess the claim on its merits but instead parse the Supreme Court's opinion to
determine what the Court "intended," they abdicate a central judicial responsibility. The
fault lies both with a Supreme Court that appears to resolve by phrase and fiat issues not
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Courts have disagreed about the applicability of Batson to
claims of discrimination against Italian-Americans, 05o and the application of Batson to one form of racial discrimination also may
prove problematic. Ruling that a pre-Batson decision limiting the
discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges precluded the
systematic exclusion of whites as well as of blacks, the Second Circuit rejected a district court decision to the contrary.1 0 9
Justice Rehnquist once wrote that classifications based on national origin, "the first cousin of race," are presumptively invalid. 110 In a nation settled in part by refugees from religious discrimination, classifications based on religious belief and affiliation
may be suspect as well. Nevertheless, prosecutors commonly do
classify on the basis of national origin and religion. In some jurisdictions, a person named Batsakis or Cohen is unlikely to sit on a
jury that tries a Greek-American or Jew; and prosecutors regard
religious affiliation as an important predictor of a juror's performance in drunk driving cases, other cases involving alcohol use,
abortion-related cases, obscenity cases, asylum cases, and cases involving clerics. The Supreme Court has concluded that classifications based on race require "strict" scrutiny, and classifications
based on national origin and religious affiliation may require strict
scrutiny as well. Nevertheless, the Court has concluded that classifications based on gender require only intermediate scrutiny."'
Whether some nonracial forms of discrimination are as invidious as
racial discrimination remains a subject of dispute. Nevertheless, in

before it and with lower courts that view the Court's nonjudicial style of adjudication as
appropriate. Rather than attribute an unconstitutional assertion of power to the Supreme
Court, see US Const, Art III, § 2, lower courts should recognize their obligation to provide
an unbiased judicial resolution of claims that have not previously been considered and resolved on their merits.
108 Compare

United States v Sgro, 816 F2d 30, 33 (lst Cir 1987), cert denied, 108 S Ct

1021 (1988) ("the defendant first must show that he is a member of a cognizable racial

group"-assuming but not deciding that "the principles of Batson ...extend to ethnic as
well as racial constituencies," the record contains no evidence that Italian-Americans qualify

as a cognizable group), with United States v Biaggi, 673 F Supp 96, 101 (E D NY 1987),
aft'd, 853 F2d 89 (2d Cir 1988) ("The court takes judicial notice that Italian-Americans are

considered in this district to be a recognizable and distinct ethnic group ....").
the

1o9Roman v Abrams, 822 F2d 214, 227-28 (2d Cir 1987). The court, however, upheld
defendant's conviction because his racial group was not "significantly under-

represented." Id at 229. See notes 101-02.
1

Trimble v Gordon, 430 US 762, 777, 780 (1977) (Rehnquist dissenting).

111 Craig v Boren, 429 US 190, 197 (1976) ("classification by gender must serve impor-

tant governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives"). Prosecutors (and defense attorneys) frequently exercise their peremptory challenges on the basis of gender in sexual assault cases, "battered-wife syndrome" cases, other

domestic violence cases, abortion-related cases, child-victim cases, and others. See note 113.
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determining what restraints the Equal Protection Clause imposes
on the jury selection process, the issue is not whether discrimination on the basis of gender, religion, ethnicity, national origin, political affiliation, or the like is "as bad as" racial discrimination. It
is simply whether this discrimination is "bad."11' 2 Once courts have
recognized that the Equal Protection Clause limits the use of peremptory challenges for trial-related reasons, challenges justified
only by a prosecutor's judgment that "I don't want women on a
jury because I can't trust them" 11 3 should be intolerable.
12 See Ballard v United States, 329 US 187, 193 (1946) ("Jury competence is an individual rather than a group or class matter. That fact lies at the very heart of the jury system. To disregard it is to open the door to class distinctions and discriminations which are
abhorrent to the democratic ideals of trial by jury.") (quoting Thiel v Southern Pacific Co,
328 US 217, 220 (1946)).
113 See the material described in text at note 199. Practice manuals sometimes exhibit
their authors' unabashed misogyny. Consider Melvin Belli's discussion of "women jurors":

This male author is reporting solely from his experience in the courtroom and, therefore, makes no apology for a presumptuousness when he reports that generally a male
juror is more sound than a woman juror .... If counsel is depending upon a clearly
applicable rule of law and if he wants to avoid a verdict of "intuition" or "sympathy,"
if his verdict in amount is to be proved by clearly demonstrated blackboard figures for
example, generally he would want a male juror....
If the plaintiff is a woman and has those qualities which other women envy-good
looks, a handsome husband, wealth, social position-then women jurors would be unwise. Woman's inhumanity to women is unequalled. They are the severest judges of
their own sex....
Women ...are desired jurors when plaintiff is a man. A woman juror may see a man
impeached from the beginning of the case to the end, but there is at least the chance
with the woman juror (particularly if the man happens to be handsome or appealing)
that the plaintiff's derelictions in and out of court will be overlooked. A woman is inclined to forgive sin in the opposite sex; but definitely not in her own....
Women jurors tend to be more acutely opinionated and come to a quicker (sometimes
unfortunately) decision than the male juror.... Once a female juror makes up her
mind (and as said above, this is usually done faster than with the male juror), even the
most cogent of reasons rarely changes it.
Melvin M. Belli, Sr., 3 Modern Trials §§ 51.6-51.68 at 446-47 (West, 2d ed 1982). See also
James W. Bouska, Selecting a Jury, in Patrick F. Healy and James P. Manak, eds, The
Prosecutor'sDeskbook 371, 373 (Natl Dist Attys Assoc, 1971) ("Women are said to be more
responsive to emotional appeals and, at least from a male point of view, are more unpredictable and subject to being deterred from properly voting for conviction by other irrelevant
factors ('I can't believe he'd steal anything. He looks like such a nice boy. Besides, there was
no evidence he ever stole anything else.') ....); John Alan Appleman, Preparationand

Trial 163 (Coiner, 1967) ("Ordinarily I don't want the argumentative female, or the barber,
who becomes the great dissenter in the jury room."); James J. Doherty, "Ready for Trial,
Your Honor" (Midwest, 1972) ("Regardless of the background of the individual female, she
will be harsher in her judgment of the complaining witness [in a rape case] than a male
juror.").
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Were Batson limited to cases of racial discrimination, the limitation would be unattractive. Nevertheless, if Batson were extended to discrimination grounded on "things like race" as well as
race itself, there might be little left of the peremptory challenge." 4
F. A Defendant's Standing to Object to Discrimination Against
Prospective Jurors of a Race Other Than His or Her Own
In Peters v Kiff,1 15 the Supreme Court set aside the conviction

of a white defendant on the ground that blacks had been unlawfully excluded from the grand jury that indicted him. Some Justices found authority for this decision in the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment; 1

6

others, in a federal statute preclud-

ing racial discrimination in the selection of state grand juries. 117
Similarly, the Court held in Taylor v Louisiana18s that a man
could challenge the unlawful exemption of women from a panel of
prospective jurors. The Court grounded this ruling on the Sixth
Amendment right to trial by an impartial jury, which it said guaranteed a defendant the right to "selection of a petit jury from a
representative cross section of the community."11 9
Like the defendant in Taylor, the defendant in Batson argued
that the government's discrimination violated his Sixth Amendment right to trial by an impartial jury. In an effort to avoid a
direct confrontation with Swain v Alabama, the defendant expressly disclaimed reliance on the Equal Protection Clause.1 20 The
Batson Court nevertheless overruled Swain, held that the Equal
Protection Clause forbids a prosecutor's racially discriminatory use
of peremptory challenges, and rejected the protests of dissenting
Justices that no question under the Equal Protection Clause was
before it. 21
Although the Court explained why it thought that reliance on
the Equal Protection Clause was permissible, 22 it did not explain
114

See text at notes 180-99.

1 6 407 US 493 (1972).

216Id at 494 (Marshall).
117Id at 505 (White concurring.)
116 419 US 522 (1975).
':' Id at 528.
120 The Supreme Court had rejected an equal protection challenge to the exemption of
women from jury service in Hoyt v Florida, 368 US 57 (1961). By relying on the Sixth
Amendment rather than the Equal Protection Clause in Taylor, the Court avoided a direct
overruling of this earlier decision. Id at 534. The defense attorney in Batson urged the Court
to dance the same doctrinal sidestep.
See 476 US at 115 (Burger dissenting) and 134 (Rehnquist dissenting).
112 Id at 84-85 n 4; see also id at 108-11 (Stevens concurring).
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why relying on this clause was preferable to accepting the ground
of decision that the defendant had advanced (a ground that was in
some ways more cautious 123 ). For reasons that appeared mysterious, the Court rested its decision on the Equal Protection Clause
rather than on the Sixth Amendment and, indeed, went to unusual
lengths to do so.
Some observers have suggested that the fair-cross-section requirement of the Sixth Amendment differs from the Fourteenth
Amendment's requirement of equal protection because it does not
demand a showing of discriminatory purpose. 12 4 Despite its label,
however, the fair-cross-section requirement does not require a fair
cross section, and proof of discriminatory effect does not establish
a violation of this requirement. The Supreme Court has said that
the fair-cross-section requirement forbids only the "systematic"
exclusion of distinctive groups from jury service, 2 5 and if any difference between "systematic" exclusion and "purposeful" exclusion
exists, it is subtle.' 26 Neither concept appears to encompass "acci123 Not only might reliance on the Sixth Amendment have made it unnecessary for the

Court to overrule Swain, but this reliance might have enabled the Court to confine Batson
to criminal cases. Unlike the Sixth Amendment, which applies only to criminal proceedings,
the Equal Protection Clause apparently precludes discrimination by government lawyers in
civil and criminal cases alike. The Batson decision's applicability to civil proceedings, however, like other troublesome issues posed by this decision, is certain to occupy the courts'
attention and consume their resources. See Clark v City of Bridgeport, 645 F Supp 890, 89496 (D Conn 1986) (applying Batson to jury selection by a government lawyer in a civil case);
Esposito v Buonome, 642 F Supp 760, 761 (D Conn 1986) (refusing to apply Batson to jury
selection in a civil case); Holley v J & S Sweeping Co., 143 Cal App 3d 588, 592-93, 192 Cal
Rptr 74 (1983) (applying a California decision similar to Batson to jury selection in civil
cases); Terrio v McDonough, 16 Mass App 163, 450 NE2d 190, 196 (1983) (indicating without deciding that the court might apply a Massachusetts decision similar to Batson to jury
selection in civil cases); Fleming v Moore, 479 US 890 (1986) (denying certiorari in a case in
which the petitioner sought to raise this issue-see 55 USLW 3100 (Aug 12, 1986)); Note,
Batson v. Kentucky: Challenging the Use of the Peremptory Challenge, 15 Am J Crim L
263, 300-01 (1988) (arguing that Batson does not preclude the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges in civil cases); Pizzi, 1987 S Ct Rev at 119 (cited in note 66) (arguing that
Batson is "fully applicable" to the government's use of peremptory challenges in some civil
cases); Note, The Civil Implications of Batson v. Kentucky and State v. Gilmore: A Further
Look at Limitations on the Peremptory Challenge, 40 Rutgers L Rev 891, 966 (1988) (arguing that Batson extends to civil cases).
124 See, for example, Wayne R. LaFave and Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure §
21.2(c) at 711 n 30 (West, 1984). As LaFave and Israel observed, three dissenting Justices in
Casteneda v Partida,430 US 482, 510 (1977) (Powell dissenting), indicated that the faircross-section requirement might invalidate some practices not condemned by the Equal
Protection Clause.
125See, for example, Taylor v Louisiana,419 US 522, 538 (1975); Duren v Missouri,439
US 357, 364 (1979); Lockhart v McCree, 476 US 162, 174 (1986).
12 Perhaps "systematic" exclusion includes "knowing" as well as "purposeful" exclusion. For example, the voting scheme upheld in City of Mobile v Bolden, 446 US 55 (1980),
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dental" exclusion (however frequently it may occur), and random
selection appears to satisfy both Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment requirements. 127 By substituting nearly identical doctrines
for one another in an effort to dismiss prior decisions, lawyers,
courts, and commentators have played a baffling numbers game.2 8
Chief Justice Burger's dissenting opinion in Batson may have
offered a hint of one reason for the majority's doctrinal grounding
of the case. A pre-Peters,pre-Taylor decision had suggested in dictum that the exemption of women from jury service would not vio-

was not intended to disadvantage blacks at its inception; but as a result of shifting housing
patterns, it later had a disadvantageous effect. This voting scheme might have been said to
disadvantage blacks "systematically" but not "purposefully."
12' For example, were the luck of the draw to yield a jury, a jury panel, or even five
consecutive jury panels composed entirely of wealthy Republican women golfers, their selection probably would not violate the Constitution. In every case in which the Supreme Court
has found a violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the differential treatment of a
distinctive group was in fact purposeful.
128 In Teague v Lane, 44 Crim L Rptr (US 1989), the Supreme Court failed to resolve
the claim of a habeas corpus petitioner that the fair-cross-section requirement precludes a
prosecutor's discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges. The Court held that a
favorable resolution of this claim would not benefit the petitioner, for this ruling would not
be applied retrospectively to a petitioner whose conviction was final at the time of the
Court's decision. Noting its prior statements that "[flairness in [jury] selection has never
been held to require proportional representation of races on a jury," the Court declared,
"[Aipplication of the fair cross section requirement to the petit jury would be a new rule."
44 Crim L Rptr at 3133.
The Court's characterization of the petitioner's fair-cross-section claim as "requiring
'fair and reasonable' proportional representation on the petit jury" was remarkable. See id
at 3133 n 1. The Court recognized that the petitioner had expressly disavowed this claim.
The Court nevertheless concluded that the petitioner had implicitly advanced the disavowed claim when he invoked the standard of Duren v Missouri, 439 US 357, 364-66
(1979). The Court had said in Duren, however, that the proportional underrepresentation of
a group would violate the fair-cross-section requirement only if this underrepresentation
were "due to systematic exclusion ... in the jury seclection process." 439 US at 364. Under
Duren, the proportional underrepresentation of a distinctive group was necessary but insufficient to establish a violation of the fair-cross-section requirement.
Justice Brennan wrote in dissent in Teague v Lane:
Teagne's claim is ... closely akin to that which prevailed in Batson v. Kentucky ...

where we held that the Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecution from using its
peremptory challenges to exclude venirepersons from the jury solely because they share
the defendant's race. The only potentially significant difference is that Teague's claim,
if valid, would bar the prosecution from excluding venirepersons from the petit jury on
account of their membership in some cognizable group, whereas the Equal Protection
Clause might not provide a basis for relief unless the defendant himself belonged to a
group whose members were improperly excluded.
44 Crim L Rptr at 3144.
By treating the fair-cross-section claim in Teague as an open question, the Supreme
Court may have signalled a retreat from what appeared to be its alternative holding in
Lockhart v McCree, 476 US 162, 174 (1986), that the fair-cross-section requirement does not
extend to petit juries.
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late a male defendant's right to equal protection of the laws.1 29 Citing this decision, Chief Justice Burger said that although
discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religious or political affiliation and the like might violate the Equal Protection Clause, "a defendant would have to establish standing to raise [the issue] before
obtaining any relief." 3 0
The majority in Batson also may have indicated that its reliance on the Equal Protection Clause was designed to circumvent
the concepts of standing articulated in Peters and Taylor. By invoking a constitutional provision not involved in those cases, the
Court may have sought to wave a wand and cause the holdings of
these cases to disappear. The Court intimated this objective in the
same sentence that foretold its possible limitation of Batson to
cases of racial discrimination: "To establish [a prima facie case of
discrimination], the defendant first must show that he is a member
of a cognizable racial group ... and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of
the defendant's race."'
Indeed, the Court appeared oblivious to the possibility that
120Alexander v

Louisiana,405 US 625, 633 (1972).
130 476 US at 124 n 4. See also Hobby v United States, 468 US 339, 347 (1984). LaFave
and Israel have asserted without qualification that "under . . . the equal protection approach, the constitutional challenge can be made only by a defendant who is a member of
the excluded class .... ." Noting an Eleventh Circuit case that had permitted a Hispanic
man to present an equal protection challenge to the exclusion of blacks and women from a
grand jury, United States v Perez-Hernandez, 672 F2d 1380 (11th Cir 1982), the authors
have suggested that "confusion on this point is to be found in some lower court cases."
LaFave and Israel, Criminal Procedure § 21.2(c) at 709 and n 17 (cited in note 121). Some
confusion on this point is also to be found in the LaFave and Israel treatise, however. The
Supreme Court has not decided the issue, and only vague dicta in Supreme Court opinions
even hint that "the constitutional challenge can be made only by a defendant who is a
member of the excluded class." Decisions that members of an excluded class may challenge
the exclusion of members of this class under the Equal Protection Clause do not justify the
conclusion that other defendants may not. This article will suggest that in some circumstances the rationale of Strauder v West Virginia, 100 US 303 (1880), entitles a defendant
who is not a member of an excluded class to challenge a prosecutorial exclusion under the
Equal Protection Clause. See text at notes 137-48.
131 476 US at 96 (emphasis added). Possibly to ensure that defendants would not have
the benefit of its Sixth Amendment rulings on standing when prosecutors discriminated
against jurors whose races did not match theirs, the Court apparently ruled one week after
Batson that the Sixth Amendment's fair-cross-section requirement extends only to the
panels from which juries are selected, not to the juries themselves. Lockhart v McCree, 476
US 162, 174 (1986). This ruling was so unjustified and so unnecessary to resolution of the
case before the Court that one may suspect an ulterior purpose. See my article, FailedPragmatism: Reflections on the Burger Court, 100 Harv L Rev 1436, 1447-48 (1987). In Teague v
Lane, 44 Crim L Rptr 3129 (US 1989), however, the Court may have retreated from Lockhart v McCree by treating the applicability of the fair-cross-section requirement to petit
juries as an open issue. See note 128.
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prosecutors might systematically exclude blacks in cases involving
white, Hispanic, Asian and Native-American defendants. The Batson opinion spoke repeatedly of the danger that a prosecutor
would "challenge[] jurors of the defendant's race on the assumption ... that they would be partial to the defendant because of
their shared race.' 1 32 It ignored other tactical goals that might
prompt racially based exclusions. In a dissenting opinion, Justice
Rehnquist voiced a similarly narrow view of the tactical objectives
of prosecutors:
In my view, there is simply nothing 'unequal' about the
State's using its peremptory challenges to strike blacks from
the jury in cases involving black defendants, so long as such
challenges are also used to exclude whites in cases involving
white defendants, Hispanics in cases involving Hispanic defendants, Asians in cases involving Asian defendants, and so
3
on.' 3
The empirical assumption apparently voiced by the majority
and Justice Rehnquist, like much of the analysis in Batson,
seemed either naive or disingenuous. Prosecutors sometimes do exclude the members of racial and other groups because they fear
what psychologists call "in-group bias"-the tendency of members
of a group to evaluate the actions of other members of that group
Perhaps more fundamentally, however, prosecutors
favorably.'
rank prospective jurors on what psychologists call an "authoritarianism scale." Criminal practitioners claim that the more "authoritarian" a juror is, the more likely he or she is to be a "good juror
for the state." Moreover, just as courthouse folklore declares that
men are more authoritarian than women, Christians (especially
fundamentalist Protestants) more authoritarian than Jews, and
Northern Europeans more authoritarian than Southern Europeans,
it proclaims that whites are more authoritarian than blacks. The
last stereotype may in fact be more powerful than the others. Innumerable "practice manuals" reveal that prosecutors-at least
those who accept the conventional cluckings of courthouse corridors-seek 35to avoid minority jurors whatever the race of the
defendant.1
...476 US at 97.
Id at 137-38 (Rehnquist dissenting).
13,See Pizzi, 1987 S Ct Rev at 129-30 (cited in note 66).
135 See, for example, John M. VanDyke, Jury Selection Procedures 153 (Ballinger,
1977); Irving Goldstein and Fred Lane, 1 Trial Technique §§ 9.45, 9.48 (Callaghan, 3d ed
1984). I understand, however, that in some prosecutorial circles older black women are re-
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In a concurring opinion in Batson, Justice Marshall presented
evidence that should have shaken the apparent premises of the
majority and Justice Rehnquist. He noted: "In 100 felony trials in
Dallas County in 1983-1984, prosecutors peremptorily struck 405
of 467 eligible black jurors; the chance of a qualified black sitting
on a jury was 1 in 10, compared to 1 in 2 for a white." 13 6 Prosecutors did not accomplish this disenfranchisement of a race by striking blacks only in cases involving black defendants.
Although the Supreme Court's language suggests that it might
not permit non-black defendants to challenge the discriminatory
exclusion of blacks from their juries, the Court offered no justification for this possible restriction.137 In 1880, the Court held in the
landmark case of Strauder v West Virginia3 s that the statutory
exclusion of blacks from jury service violated a black defendant's
right to equal protection of the laws. The Court did not discuss at
length why someone not protesting his or her own exclusion from a
jury could challenge the West Virginia statute. The Court, however, noted the social circumstances of the times:
[For the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment], it required
little knowledge of human nature to anticipate that those who
had long been regarded as an inferior and subject race would,
when suddenly raised to the rank of citizenship, be looked
upon with jealousy and positive dislike ....
It is well known that prejudices often exist against particular
classes in the community, which sway the judgment of jurors,
and which, therefore, operate in some cases to deny to persons
of those classes the full enjoyment of that protection which
others enjoy. 3 "
In a related case, Justice Strong, the author of the opinion in
Strauder, reiterated and clarified the basis of the Court's decision:
In [Strauder] we held that the Fourteenth Amendment
secures, among other civil rights, to colored men, when
garded as "good jurors for the state." In addition, blacks who are employed and married and
who have schoolage children are reputed to be "tough" in drug cases.
476 US at 104 (citing Dallas Morning News 1 (March 9, 1986)).
Of course the ability of a defendant to challenge the discriminatory exclusion of
members of a race other than his or her own was not before the Court in Batson. The
Court's language need not be read to refer to circumstances other than those presented in
Batson itself. See note 107.
1 100 US 303 (1880).
"3 Id at 306, 309.
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charged with criminal offences against a State, an impartial
jury trial, by jurors indifferently selected or chosen without
discrimination against such jurors because of their color....
We held that such an equal right to an impartial jury trial,
and such an immunity from unfriendly discrimination, are
placed by the amendment under the protection of the general
government and guaranteed by it. 40
The standing of the defendant in Strauder apparently did not
141
rest on atmospheric notions of racial identity or racial solidarity;
it rested instead on the proposition that the citizens whom the
government had arbitrarily excluded from jury service were more
likely to favor the defendant's position than the citizens whom it
had permitted to serve. In the Court's words, the defendant had
been denied "an equal right to an impartial jury trial."14' 2 In the
social climate of 1880, black jurors were more likely to favor the
defendant's acquittal than white jurors.
Strauder allowed black defendants to challenge the statutory
disqualification of blacks from jury service, and the Court's opinion
offered a plausible (though no longer accepted 4 3 ) basis for denying
white defendants the same opportunity. If, in 1880, white jurors
were likely to be biased against black defendants but not against
white defendants, the state's statutory disqualification of black jurors disadvantaged only black defendants. Apart from the people
excluded from jury service, only black defendants qualified as victims of West Virginia's "unfriendly discrimination."' 44 This basis
for differentiating black and white defendants disappears, however,
when a prosecutor discriminates in the exercise of peremptory
challenges. Unlike a statutory disqualification, the prosecutor's
challenges are designed to disadvantage black and white defendants alike; both groups are victims of the prosecutor's "unfriendly
140Ex parte Virginia, 100 US 339, 345 (1880). The Supreme Court's declaration that a
discriminatory exclusion from jury service could impair a defendant's right to "an impartial
jury trial" seems incompatible with the Court's statement more than 100 years later: "Any
claim that the jury was not impartial . . . must focus not on [a potential juror who was
excluded] but on the jurors who ultimately sat." Ross v Oklahoma, 108 S Ct 2273, 2277
(1988).
4
Moreover, although the Supreme Court has hinted that a defendant's standing to
present an equal protection challenge to the exclusion of members of his or her race from a
jury rests on the proposition that he or she is stigmatized by the exclusion, see Hobby v
United States, 468 US 339, 347 (1984), the standing of the defendant in Strauder did not
rest on the proposition that he had been stigmatized.
142 Ex Parte Virginia, 100 US at 345 (summarizing the holding in Strauder.)
113 See Peters v Kiff, 407 US 493 (1972); Taylor v Louisiana, 419 US 522 (1975).
" Ex Parte Virginia, 100 US at 345.
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discrimination."
The exclusion of a prospective juror can deny the defendant
"an equal right to an impartial jury trial" whether or not the race
of the excluded juror matches the defendant's. A defendant's prospect of success at trial is in fact no more substantially reduced by a
prosecutor's exclusion of members of his or her race from a jury
than by the prosecutor's exclusion of members of other races; every
exercise of a peremptory challenge by a prosecutor is designed to
limit the likelihood of the defendant's success at trial. A defendant
"injured in fact" by a prosecutor's discriminatory use of peremptory challenges lacks the opportunity to gain vindication at trial
that a defendant whose jury has been selected without discrimination enjoys. Under Strauder, this defendant has been denied the
equal protection of the laws and should be permitted to challenge
the prosecutor's exclusion.'4 5
The Strauder opinion might be read as "incorporating" the
right to an impartial jury trial in the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment eighty-eight years before the Supreme
Court "incorporated" the same right in the Due Process Clause. 4 "
Affording the right to an impartial jury trial to some defendants
and not to others violates the equal protection principle, and
standing under the Equal Protection Clause should therefore be
determined by the same principles that determine standing under
the Sixth Amendment.
To be sure, claims of equal protection might be pressed too
far; proving that a prosecutor's lawful challenges reduced a defendant's chances of success at trial and that prosecutors in other
cases have failed to make similar challenges would not establish an
equal protection violation. The appropriate baseline is the one suggested by Strauder: defendants are entitled to an equal right to an
impartial jury trial. Prosecutorial exclusions that make juries more
impartial do not violate this right; unjustified prosecutorial exclusions do.
The Batson opinion, however, may have rejected the factual
premises of Strauder. The Court condemned as constitutionally
impermissible the view that black jurors will be "partial to the de14 This argument rests on the assumption that some juries are in fact lawfully selected;

if they are, a defendant injured by a prosecutor's unlawful discrimination has been denied
the same opportunity to obtain vindication at trial that a defendant tried by a properly
selected jury enjoys. For this reason, the defendant has been denied equal protection
whether or not he or she otherwise would have had standing to challenge the prosecutor's
discrimination.
1,6 See Duncan v Louisiana,391 US 145 (1968).
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fendant because of their shared race." Nevertheless, on the premises of Batson, the standing of a defendant to challenge the exclusion of a juror whose race does not match his or hers seems clearer.
If prosecutors may not act on the perception that black jurors are
more likely than white jurors to acquit black defendants, the Supreme Court also should be precluded from acting on this perception. The Court could not fairly limit the standing of defendants
on the basis of a perception that it regarded as racist when held by
prosecutors.147 Under Strauder, a defendant may challenge any exclusion that denies him or her "an equal right to an impartial
jury"; and unless a court can conclude that one exclusion infringes
this right more substantially than another, the defendant must
have standing either to challenge both exclusions or to challenge
8
neither.

14

Limiting the standing of defendants in the manner that Batson seems to contemplate would require courts to draw troublesome racial lines. If defendants were allowed to challenge the exclusion only of members of their own races, a defendant whose
grandparents were black, Hispanic, Asian, and Native American
apparently would be permitted to challenge the exclusion of mem147 Of course, if white jurors as a group are no longer more likely than black jurors to

convict black defendants, the factual basis of the decision in Strauder is unsound. Batson
may suggest that the Supreme Court should overrule Strauder. Even were the Court to
adopt this all but unthinkable position, however, it might permit defendants to challenge
the discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges by prosecutors. When a prosecutor has
concluded that particular jurors are likely to favor a defendant, the defendant is more
plainly "injured in fact" by the exclusion of these jurors than he would be by a broader, less
refined statutory exclusion.
148 To reiterate in somewhat different language the analysis in text, one might conclude,
as Strauder did, that black jurors are more likely to acquit black defendants than white
jurors. This view, however, would not justify the different conclusion that black jurors challenged by a prosecutorare more likely to favor the defendant than white jurors challenged
by the prosecutor. Every improper exclusion by a prosecutor reduces the defendant's chance
of success at trial and makes conviction more likely than it would be if the defendant were
tried by a properly constituted trial jury. Every unjustified exclusion therefore denies the
defendant "an equal right to an impartial jury trial." Strauderprovides no basis for permitting a defendant to challenge the peremptory exclusion of some prospective jurors but not
others.
Alternatively, one might conclude, as the Batson Court did, that black jurors are no
more likely to be "partial" to black defendants than white jurors (or, perhaps, that it is
unconstitutional to act on the assumption that blacks and whites differ in their partiality
toward black defendants whether this premise is accurate or not). On this view, one must
reach the same conclusion at an earlier stage of analysis. Again there is no basis for treating
the exclusion of black jurors and exclusion of white jurors differently-at least not when the
issue is the one posed by Strauder,impairment of a defendant's "equal right to an impartial
jury trial."
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A defendant whose ancestry was less

diverse would have less power to object to a prosecutor's racial discrimination. In determining precisely what ancestry would qualify
a defendant as black, white, brown or red, courts might find guidance in some older decisions of states that practiced de jure segregation, in the opinions of South African tribunals, and in the
precedents of Nazi Germany.
After determining the ancestry of defendants and prospective
jurors, courts would confront issues of racial matching. A court
might be required to decide, for example, whether a MexicanAmerican defendant could challenge the discriminatory exclusion
of Puerto Rican jurors (or Castilian-American jurors) on the
ground that the defendant and the jurors were Hispanic or
whether instead the defendant and the jurors should be regarded
as members of different groups. 150
Although compelling reasons for classifying people on the basis of race sometimes may exist, concepts of standing resting on
notions of "racial solidarity" do not advance compelling goals. Far
from being mandated by Article III of the Constitution, these concepts require racial classifications that may violate the Equal Protection Clause. Declaring that inquiry into the racial and ethnic
background of prospective jurors is "unseemly and intrusive," the
Arizona Supreme Court has rejected the ungenerous hint of Batson
and ruled that a white defendant may challenge the discriminatory
exclusion of black prospective jurors. 5 '

149

A court might conclude, however, that this defendant was a member of no distinc-

tive "racial group" so that he or she would lack standing to challenge the discriminatory
exclusion of anyone. Compare People v Seals, 153 Ill App 3d 417, 505 NE2d 1107, 1111
(1987) (allowing a defendant of racially mixed ancestry who had "the appearance of a black"
to challenge the exclusion of black jurors).
150 A court might rule in one case that Mexican-Americans and Puerto Ricans should
be treated as members of the same ethnic group. It might rule in the next case, however,
that, in light of the historic enmity between China and Japan and their lack of a common
language, a Japanese-American defendant could not challenge the discriminatory exclusion
of prospective Chinese-American jurors. One cringes at the prospect of turning constitutional rights on the invidious, irrelevant inquiries that Batson seems to contemplate.
151 State v Superior Court, 157 Ariz 541, 760 P2d 541, 544-45 (Ariz 1988) (relying on
the Sixth Amendment rather than the Equal Protection Clause). See also State v Gilmore,
103 NJ 508, 511 A2d 1150, 1164 and n 9 (1986) (relying on the New Jersey rather than the
United States Constitution). But see United States v Townsley, 856 F2d 1189, 1190 (8th Cir
1988) (en banc) (Batson is "clear and straightforward" in denying standing to white defendants to challenge the exclusion of black prospective jurors); United States v Vaccaro, 816
F2d 443, 457 (9th Cir 1987) (alternative holding); Torres v State, 44 Crim L Rptr 2409 (Fla
App 1989) (a white defendant, even one represented by a black attorney, does not have
standing to challenge the exclusion of black prospective jurors); People v Holland, 121 Ill 2d
136, 520 NE 2d 270, 279-80 (1987) (a white defendant lacks standing under Batson to pre-
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Although this article has argued that a prosecutor's discriminatory exclusion of jurors whose races differ from the defendant's
can violate the defendant's Fourteenth Amendment rights, this issue may not be decisive. On occasion, the Supreme Court has permitted litigants to assert rights other than their own. Allowing defendants to assert the Fourteenth Amendment rights of excluded
jurors would avoid the complexities of Strauder's hybrid concept
of "an equal right to an impartial jury trial."
When prosecutors discriminate in the exercise of peremptory
challenges, the rights they violate most clearly and directly are
those of prospective jurors. The interests of these jurors include
not only the opportunity to serve on juries (an opportunity that
many of them would gladly decline) but also and more importantly
their freedom from classification on invidious grounds. Indeed, as
the Supreme Court noted in Batson, "The harm from discriminatory jury selection extends beyond that inflicted on the defendant
and the excluded juror to touch the entire community.' ' 5 2 Holding
that the parties to a criminal case may assert the rights of improperly excluded jurors would permit defendants to challenge the exclusion of jurors of races other than their own. Moreover, this holding would permit prosecutors to challenge discrimination by
defense attorneys-a result that the next section of this article will
suggest could not occur if prosecutors were allowed to assert only
the rights of the government.
The Supreme Court has observed:
Where practical obstacles prevent a party from asserting
rights on behalf of itself, . . . the Court has recognized the

doctrine of jus tertii standing. In such a situation, the Court
considers whether the third party has sufficient injury-in-fact
to satisfy the Art. III case-or-controversy requirement, and
whether, as a prudential matter, the third party can reasonably be expected properly to frame the issues and present them
with the necessary adversarial zeal. 53
A prospective juror subjected to unconstitutional discrimination by a prosecutor faces not only practical but legal obstacles to
the vindication of his or her rights. This juror may be unaware that
sent an equal protection challenge to the exclusion of blacks, and the discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges does not violate the Sixth Amendment's fair-cross-section requirement), cert granted, 109 S Ct 1309 (1989).
152 476

US at 87.

,53Secretary of State of Md. v J. H. Munson Co., 467 US 947, 956 (1984).
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any discrimination has occurred; and even if the juror recognizes or
suspects that it has, he or she is almost certain to be unrepresented
by counsel. Although an unusually assertive juror might demand a
hearing on the propriety of his or her exclusion, the predictable
judicial response would be one of rejection-probably one of astonished rejection. The court would reply that a juror may not interrupt an ongoing criminal proceeding to demand a hearing simply
because the juror's own rights may have been violated. In accordance with customary practice, jurors should speak only when spoken to.""
Once a jury has been empaneled, the violation of an excluded
juror's rights is complete, and no remedy can prevent the wrong. In
the unlikely event that an excluded juror sought a remedy, moreover, he or she would fail. It plainly would be too late to secure a
place on the jury through injunction or mandamus; and if the excluded juror attempted to prevent recurrence of the prosecutor's
discrimination in a future case, the court would respond that the
threat of repetition was remote and the pattern of unconstitutionality insufficiently established by a single act of discrimination.' 5
Were the excluded juror then to seek damages for the prosecutor's
violation of his or her rights, the juror would discover that prosecutors are immune from liability for even deliberate abuse of their
courtroom responsibilities.'5 6 Whatever the chance that sufficiently
repeated prosecutorial abuse might lead to injunctive relief in a
class action-and it is not great-an individual wrongly excluded
from a jury cannot secure any redress for the violation of his or her
rights.
Although prospective jurors are legally as well as practically
precluded from vindicating their rights, a criminal defendant suffers "injury in fact" from every unlawful exclusion by a prosecutor.
(At least the prosecutor believes that the exclusion will diminish
the defendant's prospect of success at trial.) Unlike the prospective
juror, the defendant usually is represented by counsel and can seek
to prevent the wrong rather than merely correct it. 157 Moreover,
the high stakes of criminal prosecutions encourage defendants to
present claims of discrimination with "the necessary adversary
zeal" and sometimes more. Were a court to reject a defendant's
claim that unlawful discrimination by a prosecutor violated his or

154

See text at notes 34-37.

15 See, for example, Rizzo v Goode, 423 US 362 (1976).
155 See Imbler v Pachtman, 424 US 409 (1976).
151 See text at notes 97-100.
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her rights, the defendant nevertheless should have standing to assert the rights of excluded jurors. A defendant injured in fact by a
prosecutor's unconstitutional exclusion presents a classic case of
appropriate third party standing. This standing, moreover, is unaffected by whether the excluded juror is the same color as the
defendant.
In Rose v Mitchell,'58 the Supreme Court reaffirmed its prior
decisions that convicted defendants may demonstrate racial discrimination in the selection of grand juries and thereby secure
habeas corpus relief even after their conviction by properly constituted trial juries. A finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt by a
fairly chosen trial jury seems to establish probable cause to place a
defendant on trial and more. Defects in the initial determination
of probable cause can be seen, in retrospect, not to have affected
substantial rights of the defendant. 5 ' The Supreme Court nevertheless observed, "The exclusion from grand jury service of Negroes, or any group otherwise qualified to serve, impairs the confidence of the public in the administration of justice.""'6 Primarily
for this reason, the Court concluded that proof of racial discrimination in the selection of a grand jury would entitle a prisoner to
relief from his or her conviction "without inquiry into whether [he
or she] was prejudiced in fact by the discrimination at the grand
jury stage."''
When a prosecutor has discriminated in the exercise of peremptory challenges, the injury to excluded jurors and to the community is like that in Rose v Mitchell, but the injury to the defendant seems far less ephemeral. The concerns that led to the
decision in Rose also should entitle a defendant to challenge any
unlawful exclusion by a prosecutor-whether the target of this unlawful exclusion is a member of the defendant's race or some other.
G. Racial Discrimination by Defense Attorneys
In Miami in 1980, four white police officers were tried on
charges that they had beaten to death a black man arrested for a
traffic violation. The defendants' attorneys, acting together, struck
158 443 US 545 (1979). See also Vasquez v Hillary, 474 US 254, 260-64 (1986) (reaffirm-

ing Rose and declaring that racial discrimination in the selection of a grand jury can never
be treated as harmless error).

I'l

See Rose, 443 US at 574 (Stewart concurring); Cassell v Texas, 339 US 282, 302

(1950) (Jackson dissenting).
6 Rose, 443 US at 556.
161Id.
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every potential black juror, and the all-white jury that their challenges produced acquitted the officers. The Miami riots followed.
Four years later, another Miami police officer was charged
with manslaughter in the death of a black suspect. Again the defense attorney's strikes produced an all-white jury; again the defendant was acquitted; and again the acquittal sparked public outcry (this time, fortunately, nonviolent).' 6 2
After the second controversial acquittal, the Florida Supreme
Court ruled that racial discrimination in the selection of a trial
jury by either the prosecution or the defense violates the Florida
constitution.6 3 Discrimination by defense attorneys can undermine
the democratic values of the jury system and subvert public confidence in the administration of justice as powerfully as racial discrimination by prosecutors.6
Confining its language to the case before it for a change, the
Supreme Court said in Batson, "We express no views on whether
the Constitution imposes any limit on the exercise of peremptory
challenges by defense counsel."' 6 5 Chief Justice Burger, writing in
dissent, appeared skeptical of the Court's reservation of the issue:
[T]he clear and inescapable import of this novel holding will
inevitably be to limit the use of this valuable tool to both
prosecutors and defense attorneys alike. Once the Court has
held that prosecutors are limited in their use of peremptory
challenges, could we rationally hold that defendants are not?
"Our criminal justice system 'requires not only freedom from
any bias against the accused, but also from any prejudice
against his prosecution. Between him and the state the scales
are to be evenly held.' "166
162 See Pizzi, 1987 S Ct Rev at 153-54 (cited in note 66).
113 Neil

v State, 457 S2d 481, 486 (Fla 1984). Similarly, state courts in California and

Massachusetts have condemned racial discrimination by prosecutors and defense attorneys
alike. People v Wheeler, 22 Cal 3d 258, 148 Cal Rptr 890 (1978); Commonwealth v Soares,
377 Mass 461, 387 NE2d 499, 516 (1979).
16 In 1986, whites were reported to have committed 81,000 crimes against black victims. See Marcia Coyle, Can Bias by Defense Be Barred?,Natl L J 3, 30 (Nov 14, 1988).
"' 476 US at 89 n 12. Although Justice Marshall expressed disapproval of discrimination by defense attorneys, he did not argue that this discrimination was unconstitutional.
Instead, he merely asserted that, if the Supreme Court were to abolish the use of peremptory challenges by prosecutors (as he argued that it should), a state legislature might constitutionally eliminate the use of peremptory challenges by defense attorneys. Id at 107-08
(Marshall concurring).
166 Id at 125-26 (Burger dissenting) (quoting both the concurring opinion of Justice
Marshall in Batson, id at 107, and Justice Marshall's quotation of Hayes v Missouri, 120 US
68, 70 (1887)) (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
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Contrary to Chief Justice Burger's apparent intimation, nothing in the Constitution entitles a state to balanced scales or even a
fair trial in criminal cases. In accordance with its central objective-the control of governmental power-the Constitution generally creates rights against the government, not rights in favor of
the government.167 At least in state courts,1 68 if the Constitution
restricts the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges by defense attorneys, it does so only by guaranteeing prospective jurors
the right to equal protection of the laws.
Discrimination by defense attorneys violates this right only if
it qualifies as state action,16 9 but a court should not hesitate to
hold that it does. Jurors are paid public employees charged with
important responsibilities, and defense attorneys discriminate in
the selection of these officials only because state statutes and rules
expressly delegate the power to select jurors to them.'7 0 Moreover,
when attorneys use this power, judges ratify their choices by formally discharging the prospective jurors whom the attorneys have
disapproved. A state should not be permitted to delegate the
power to determine the composition of official tribunals and then
disclaim responsibility for the predictably discriminatory way in
which this authority is exercised.
That defense attorneys act as "officers of the court" in selecting trial jurors is more than a metaphor, and a decision that in
doing so they perform an inherently governmental task would not
imply that their other functions are subject to constitutional restraint as well.17 ' Although this brief analysis does not exhaust the
reasons for viewing the selection of trial jurors by lawyers as state
167 For example, the Constitution forbids the government from depriving any person of
life, liberty or property without due process of law. US Const, Amend V and Amend XIV. It
does not forbid a person from depriving the government of life, liberty or property without
due process of law. See Susan Bandes, Taking Some Rights Too Seriously: The State's
Right to a Fair Trial, 60 S Cal L Rev 1019 (1987).
18 Article III, § 2 of the United States Constitution provides that "the trial of all
Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury." This provision might plausibly
be interpreted to afford the federal government a right to jury trial in criminal cases. But
see Patton v United States, 281 US 276, 298 (1930) ("Article III, Section 2... was meant to
confer a right upon the accused which he may forego at his election"). Plainly neither the
Sixth nor the Fourteenth Amendment confers any right to jury trial upon state
governments.
16' See Civil Rights Cases, 109 US 3, 13 (1883).
170 See, for example, FRCrP 24(a); 11A NY CPL, § 270.15(2) (McKinney 1982).
171 Compare Branti v Finkel, 445 US 507, 519 (1980) (public defender acts under color
of state law in hiring and firing state employees), with Polk County v Dodson, 454 US 312,
318 (1981) (public defender does not act under color of state law in representing a client at
trial simply because he or she holds a license from the state to practice law).
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action,171 courts should hold that the exercise of peremptory challenges by defendants and defense attorneys is subject to constitutional restraints.
A more substantial hurdle to controlling discrimination by defense attorneys is the restricted concept of standing that the Supreme Court intimated it might approve. Permitting prosecutors to
resist all discriminatory challenges by defense attorneys would be
unconscionable if defendants were unable to resist all discriminatory challenges by prosecutors. Were a defendant able to challenge
only the unlawful exclusion of members of his or her race, the govermnent, which is neither white nor black, apparently would lack
standing to challenge the exclusion of anyone.
The Supreme Court's effort to impose only minimal restraints
on the use of peremptory challenges by prosecutors may have been
too clever. Eliminating the ability of defendants to challenge the
exclusion of members of races other than their own would appear
to eliminate altogether the ability of prosecutors to challenge discrimination by defense attorneys; prosecutors must have standing
either to challenge all unlawful discrimination by defense attorneys
or else to challenge none. Perhaps, in light of the Supreme Court's
apparently restrictive view of standing, it should not have treated
the power of defense attorneys to discriminate in the exercise of
peremptory challenges as an open question.
When defense attorneys discriminate, the rights they violate
are those of prospective jurors; and as noted above, these jurors are
unable to vindicate their rights. Just as defendants should be permitted to act as surrogates for excluded jurors in challenging discrimination by prosecutors, prosecutors should be permitted to act
as surrogates in challenging discrimination by defense attorneys. A
conventional view of both the law of third party standing and the
law of state action suggests that discrimination by defense attorneys should be limited in the same way and to the same extent
that discrimination by prosecutors is restricted. Nevertheless, only
a concept of third party standing that would empower defendants
to challenge all unlawful discrimination by prosecutors could pro172 See People v Gary M., 526 NYS2d 986, 994 (S Ct 1988) (holding after careful analy-

sis of the issue that the discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges by defense attorneys is impermissible state action); Note, Discriminationby the Defense: Peremptory Challenges After Batson v. Kentucky, 88 Colum L Rev 355, 358-61 (1988); Note, 40 Rutgers L
Rev at 949-55 (cited in note 123). But see Holtzman v Supreme Court, Kings County, 526
NYS2d 892, 898 (S Ct 1988); Goldwasser, Limiting a CriminalDefendant's Use of Peremptory Challenges (cited in note 65); Note, Defendant's Discriminatory Use of the Peremptory Challenge after Batson v. Kentucky, 62 St John's L Rev 46 (1987).
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duce this reciprocal control. Chief Justice Burger may have been
correct that "[b]etween [the accused] and the state the scales are
to be evenly held," but there is only one legitimate way to achieve
this balance under the Constitution.
H. The Unconstitutionality of the Peremptory Challenge: Is It
Bedtime for Batson?
This article's review of seven areas of litigation created by
Batson1 ' suggests that this decision will generate expensive and
divisive courtroom proceedings for years or even decades to come.
Like much of the Batson opinion, the Supreme Court's declaration, "Nor are we persuaded by the State's suggestion that our
holding will create serious administrative difficulties,' 74 seemed to
reveal a limited understanding of the litigation process. In the
brief period since Batson was decided, hundreds of reported appellate cases and a larger number of trial court hearings have confirmed William Pizzi's observation: "If one wanted to understand
how the American trial system for criminal cases came to be the
most expensive and time-consuming in the world, it would be difficult to find a better starting point than Batson."17 5 Batson has imposed heavy administrative costs for one apparent reason: The Supreme Court sought to manifest its symbolic opposition to racial
discrimination while doing as little as possible to alter the peremptory challenge.
If the Batson decision notably reduces some forms of discrimination by prosecutors, it nevertheless will offer a lesson in hydraulics. Batson has moved discrimination from the intentions and unexplained practices of trial lawyers to the pages of appellate
173 Eight areas if one counts the question of Batson's applicability to civil proceedings.
See note at 123. Batson has spawned litigation concerning other issues as well. Notably,
both the Sixth Circuit and the Seventh Circuit have ruled that when a defendant makes a
prima facie showing of discrimination, a prosecutor may explain his or her reasons for striking prospective black jurors outside the presence of the defendant and the defendant's lawyer. United States v Davis, 809 F2d 1194, 1201 (6th Cir 1987), cert denied, 107 S Ct 3234
(1987); United States v Tucker, 836 F2d 334, 340 (7th Cir 1988). This procedure seems no
more consistent with due process than the banishment of the plaintiff in a Title VII action
during the defendant's presentation of his or her case. Two other federal Courts of Appeals
have indicated that they might approve ex parte, in camera explanations by prosecutors in
truly exceptional circumstances (for example, when an undercover investigation has revealed that a prospective juror is a drug dealer and the government does not wish to tip its
hand); but these courts have declined to follow the more expansive Sixth and Seventh Circuit rulings. United States v Thompson, 827 F2d 1254, 1259 (9th Cir 1987); United States v
Garrison, 849 F2d 103, 106-07 (4th Cir 1988).
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476 US at 99.
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Pizzi, 1987 S Ct Rev at 155 (cited in note 66).
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reports. Dark motives and tactics that formerly were unexpressed
(however strongly their presence was suspected) have emerged into
the light of judicial approval.
Batson has created a new legal institution, the "quasi-peremptory challenge." The peremptory challenge permitted courts to
presume that prosecutors were acting for legitimate reasons even
when they probably were not, but the quasi-peremptory challenge
denies courts this indulgence. The Supreme Courts's new form of
challenge requires explanation, although not justification or cause.
When a prosecutor declares, "I struck this potential juror because
she is handicapped and therefore might sympathize with someone's misfortune," a judge is likely to reply, "You did not strike
her because she is black. That is good enough." More important
than the economic costs of Batson are the invidious distinctions
that it draws and invites.
When the dust settles (if it does), Batson may stand for the
following propositions: 17 6 (1) Although prosecutors may not discriminate against blacks, defense attorneys may. (2) Prosecutors
may not discriminate against black jurors in cases with black defendants, but they may discriminate against black jurors in cases
with white defendants. (3) For practical purposes, discrimination
means taking more than one or two "shots" at prospective black
jurors in a single case. A court need not conduct an inquiry until a
prosecutor has made things look bad, so one or two "free shots"
are permissible. (4) Prosecutors who wish to discriminate against
more than one or two blacks in a single case must advance reasons
for their challenges that appear racially neutral. (5) Nevertheless,
because black defendants are entitled to no more than proportional representation of their race on a jury, prosecutors may exclude more than one or two blacks without giving reasons when an
unusual number of blacks appear on the panel of prospective jurors. (6) Although prosecutors may not discriminate against blacks,
they may discriminate against unemployed people, people who fail
to maintain eye contact with prosecutors, people who stare at prosecutors, liberals, social workers, people who live in public housing,
people who have not finished high school, and others who also happen to be black. (7) Similarly, prosecutors may discriminate
176 The description that follows does not indicate the inevitable end point of the litigation that Batson has engendered; but even if many courts ultimately reject some of the
limitations that some courts now embrace, Batson will have imposed substantial administrative costs and engendered artificial and disturbing constitutional rulings for the sake of a
limited gain.
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against women, Jews, Italian-Americans, homosexuals, and the
handicapped. (8) When prosecutors discriminate in violation of
these principles, the victims of their discrimination will be excluded from the jury (along with other prospective jurors) and the
jury selection process begun anew.
Whether Batson marks a substantial victory in the struggle to
abolish discrimination in the administration of criminal justice is
debatable. As much as and perhaps more than the decision in
Swain, Batson brings to the surface and appears to ratify crude
and unbecoming ways of classifying human beings.
Were a court to demand a good (rather than merely a racially
neutral) reason for the exclusion of a prospective juror (that is, if
only challenges for cause were allowed), none of the troublesome
propositions suggested above would infect the American law of
jury selection. Courts would hear the reasons for a prospective juror's exclusion before deciding whether to exclude him or her; they
would not await the exclusion of this juror (and others) before conducting a hearing on whether to conduct a hearing on whether the
reasons for the juror's exclusion were racially neutral (albeit repugnant). Only the Supreme Court's desire to preserve the "wonderful
power" of the peremptory challenge17 7 has led it to disapprove
some invidious discrimination while apparently validating much
more, and only this desire has led the Court to create cumbersome
procedures for determining which peremptory strikes are not sim178
ply awful but awful and forbidden.
Dissenting in Batson, Chief Justice Burger objected to the majority's limitation of the peremptory challenge and expressed more
forcefully than the majority a desire to shield this challenge from
change. Chief Justice Burger first argued that, because the peremptory challenge could not survive the application of basic equal
protection standards, it should be exempted from conventional
equal protection analysis:
[T]he Court also invokes general equal protection principles
in support of its holding. But peremptory challenges are often
lodged, of necessity, for reasons "normally thought irrelevant
to legal proceedings or official action, namely, the race, reli17 See Barbara A. Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful Power", 27 Stan L
Rev 545 (1975).
178 See Chisolm v State, 529 S2d 635, 639 (Miss 1988) ("[Tlhe challenge cannot be
exercised for a racially discriminatory reason. But this in no way precludes exercise of a
peremptory challenge for a non-race based reason that objective and fair-minded persons
might regard as absurd.").
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gion, nationality, occupation or affiliations of people summoned for jury duty." .. .Moreover, in making peremptory
challenges, both the prosecutor and defense attorney necessarily act on only limited information or hunch. The process can
not be indicted on the sole basis that such decisions are made
on the basis of "assumption" or "intuitive judgment." ... As a
result, unadulterated equal protection analysis is simply inapplicable to peremptory challenges exercised in any particular
case. A clause that requires a minimum "rationality"in government actions has no application to "'an arbitraryand capricious right'" . . . ; a constitutional principle that may invalidate state action on the basis of "stereotypic notions" ...
does not explain the breadth of a procedure exercised on the
"'sudden impressions and unaccountable prejudices we are
apt to conceive upon the bare looks and gestures of
another.'

"19

Within a few pages, however, the Chief Justice abandoned his
assertion of the primacy of practice over constitutional principle.
After maintaining that equal protection standards and the peremptory challenge are hopelessly incompatible, he argued that the
peremptory challenge can pass constitutional muster after all:
The Court never applies th[e] conventional equal protection framework to the claims at hand, perhaps to avoid acknowledging that the state interest involved here has historically been regarded by this Court as substantial, if not
compelling. Peremptory challenges have long been viewed as a
means to achieve an impartial jury .... Under conventional
equal protection principles, a state interest of this magnitude
and ancient lineage might well overcome an equal protection
objection ....180
Chief Justice Burger was correct the first time. A compelling
reason for acting on the basis of a whim, hunch or "unaccountable
prejudice" is difficult to conceive. A prospective juror is subject to
a challenge for cause whenever there is sound reason to consider
him or her biased. It is only when prosecutors lack this "rational
476 US at 123 (Burger dissenting) (citations omitted and emphasis supplied).
180Id at 125. Although Chief Justice Burger emphasized the historic pedigree of peremptory challenges, in Blackstone's time peremptory challenges merely determined which
male property owners served on juries. Because official discrimination had come earlier,
these peremptory challenges were less likely than today's challenges to be exercised on invidious bases. Indeed, peremptory challenges do not seem to have been exercised very much
at all. See text at notes 51-52.
179
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basis" for exclusion that they challenge jurors peremptorily. As the
Chief Justice initially seemed to recognize, the tension between the
Equal Protection Clause and the peremptory challenge is inescapable. The Equal Protection Clause says in essence, "When the
government treats people differently, it has to have a reason." The
peremptory challenge says in essence, "No, it doesn't."
Trial lawyers frequently observe that they use their peremptory challenges, not to secure impartial juries, but to secure juries
likely to favor their positions. Nevertheless, the available evidence
suggests that they often fall short of their partisan goals. Their
folk wisdom, trial experiences, mystic intuitions, and crude group
stereotypes do not in fact enable them to predict which jurors will
favor their positions.
In an experiment conducted by Hans Zeisel and Shari Seidman Diamond, prospective jurors who had been struck by prosecutors and defense attorneys in twelve federal cases sat as "shadow
juries" in these cases. In each case, the people who had been excluded by the lawyers observed the trial and were treated as much
like the trial jurors as possible (seeing the same exhibits, leaving
the courtroom when the jury was excluded, and the like). In a departure from ordinary practice, the excluded jurors were kept from
knowing who had excluded them. Nevertheless, Zeisel and Diamond knew. They also knew the initial votes as well as the final
verdicts of the trial juries. By comparing the votes of the trial jurors with those of the prospective jurors whom a lawyer had excluded, the researchers determined whether this lawyer had improved his or her position through the use of peremptory strikes.
They found that prosecutors had not. The prospective jurors
whom government lawyers excluded were as likely to favor conviction as the jurors actually seated. Defense attorneys were somewhat more effective, but even their challenges were only marginally
better than random guesses."8 ' Peremptory challenges provide opportunities for game playing and the exercise of pseudo-expertise
by trial lawyers, but it seems doubtful that they accomplish much
more. When lawyers cannot evaluate prospective jurors well
enough to advance even their own tactical goals, the claim that
their exclusions further broader public purposes seems strained.""
181 Hans Zeisel and Shari Seidman Diamond, The Effect of Peremptory Challenges on
Jury and Verdict: An Experiment in Federal District Court, 30 Stan L Rev 491, 513-18
(1978).
8I Defenders of the peremptory challenge could fairly note that the lawyers studied by
Zeisel and Diamond might have been more successful if they had been afforded greater
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Despite the findings of Zeisel and Diamond, litigants may
often have rational grounds for their use of peremptory challenges
in terms of their own primary objective-winning. Under the
Equal Protection Clause, however, the issue is whether their classifications rationally advance a public or governmental interest-that is, whether the parties' duel of peremptory challenges
produces a more impartial jury. Even if one assumes that lawyers
can identify the jurors most likely to favor their opponents, the
lawyers' offsetting challenges seem unlikely to further any public
goal.
Imagine a statute that generalized the principle underlying
any specific use of a peremptory challenge to exclude a prospective
juror who could not be disqualified for cause. This statute might
disqualify from jury service both people who smile at defense attorneys and people who smile at prosecutors, or it might disqualify
from a jury anyone with a child the same age as the defendant and
anyone with a child the same age as the complaining witness. Although the line drawn by this statute might be less offensive than
many of the lines that lawyers draw in exercising peremptory challenges, it probably could not survive constitutional scrutiny. This
statute might narrow the range from which the jury could be
drawn, but the resulting jury would not appear more "impartial"
than one drawn from a broader range. A statute that disqualified a
prospective juror for smiling at a lawyer or for having a child of a
particular age would lack a rational basis. The peremptory challenge is no better and often may be worse.
In Brown v Rice, 1 3 a prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to remove from the jury in a capital case all prospective jurors who expressed even slight reservations about capital punishment. Under the Supreme Court's decision in Witherspoon v
Illinois,8 4 the disqualification of these jurors for cause would have
violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to an impartial
8 5 and the
jury at the sentencing phase of his trial,"
federal district
opportunities to question prospective jurors during the voir dire examination. Similarly,
proponents of the death penalty sometimes argue that capital punishment might have a
more demonstrable deterrent effect if it were applied more broadly and uniformly, and proponents of efforts to rehabilitate criminals sometimes dismiss negative empirical evaluations
by pointing to the possibility of establishing more ambitious rehabilitative programs than
any yet evaluated. It is always possible to do more; but when the costs of doing more appear
unjustified, the failure of current practices suggests doing less.
693 F Supp 381, 389-94 (W D NC 1988).
391 US 510 (1968).
In post-Witherspoon declarations, the Supreme Court has said that no exclusion
from a jury can violate the Sixth Amendment so long as the people who remain on the jury
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court in Brown concluded, "The ultimate outcome of a jury organized to return a verdict of death is no less partial when achieved
through peremptory challenges than when achieved through challenges for cause."18' 6
In one respect, the peremptory challenges invalidated in
Brown differed from the disqualification invalidated in Witherspoon. The defendant's attorney might have challenged unequivocal proponents of the death penalty while the prosecutor challenged people who voiced reservations about this penalty. The
mutual power of these attorneys to whittle away at society was unlike a disqualification that favored one side. The Batson decision,
however, rejected the proposition that two wrongs make a right.
The ability of the defense attorney in Brown to exclude enthusiastic proponents of the death penalty no more justified the prosecutor's challenges than the ability of the defense attorney in Batson
to challenge whites justified the prosecutor's elimination of blacks.
In addition, the distribution of groups targeted by prosecutors
and defense attorneys is unlikely to be symmetrical. Ninety percent of a community may be German-American and ten percent
black. Similarly, eighty percent may be enthusiastic proponents of
capital punishment while twenty percent may have reservations
about this penalty. In a particular community, the prosecutor may
be able to eliminate all blacks from a jury or all jurors with reservations about the death penalty while the defense attorney may
not be able to eliminate all German-Americans or all enthusiastic
proponents of capital punishment. A jury reflecting the median of
the community may be little different from a jury drawn from one
of the poles. This jury, composed entirely of representatives of one
distinctive group, may be far from a representative cross section of
the community. Whatever the distribution of groups and attitudes
in a community, things are unlikely to come out even. If the Supreme Court were to reject the position of the district court in
Brown, its decision might do for the holding in Witherspoon what
the Court's decision in Swain did in Talledega County for the

can judge the case fairly. In the "special context of capital sentencing," however, the Sixth
Amendment continues to forbid "the effects of an 'imbalanced jury"' and to require an
examination of exclusions as well as inclusions. See Lockhart v McCree, 476 US 162, 182-84
(1986). To the Supreme Court, the language of the Sixth Amendment carries a variety of
meanings.
188 Brown, 693 F Supp at 392. Four Supreme Court Justices have rejected the position
of the District Court in Brown. See Gray v Mississippi, 107 S Ct 2045, 2062 (1987) (Scalia
dissenting, joined by three other Justices), and so has the North Carolina Supreme Court.
See also State v Fullwood, 373 SE2d 518 (NC 1988).
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holding in Strauder-reducethat earlier ruling to a symbol.11
From a prosecutor's perspective, however, it is difficult to imagine a more rational basis for the use of peremptory challenges
than the one held unconstitutional in Brown. The court's decision
reveals how little might be left of the peremptory challenge if it
were subjected to ordinary constitutional restraints. When a prosecutor may not challenge prospective jurors in a capital case because these jurors have expressed reservations about the death
penalty, one wonders what this prosecutor may do instead-challenge prospective jurors who are round-faced and jovial
or who wear campaign buttons advocating "Cuomo for President in
1992?" If surrogates for the forbidden criterion are impermissible,
what remains? The prosecutor in Brown presumably decided to
ask for the death penalty because he believed that the defendant
deserved it. If the case is retried, how close may the prosecutor
come to obtaining the hanging jury that he seeks? Ordering the
prosecutor to exercise his peremptory challenges but not to seek a
jury stacked in favor of the death penalty commands the impossible; the peremptory challenge would be better abolished, at least in
capital cases in which the Witherspoon standards apply.
Although peremptory challenges could rarely survive even
minimal "rational basis" scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause, the claim that these challenges serve useful purposes cannot entirely be dismissed.'
On occasion, unexplained challenges
have provided a gentle way of excluding prospective jurors who
probably should not have been permitted to serve. When a prospective juror has told the court that he or she can be impartial,
rejecting this assurance and excluding the juror for cause is likely
to seem insulting. In this situation, the peremptory challenge has
permitted both judges and prospective jurors to save face. Judges
have resolved their doubts against exclusion, relying on the peremptory challenge to correct their errors and to do so without explicitly rejecting the jurors' protestations of impartiality.
Practitioners report in fact that judges often ask questions
designed to secure declarations of impartiality, then treat these
declarations as conclusive. Practitioners also maintain that neither
the prosecutor, defense attorney, nor judge may trust the fairness
of a juror whose statements provide no basis for exclusion but
whose manner seems erratic. They suggest that the peremptory
challenge permits the removal of "three dollar bills" from the jury.
187

See text at notes 42-47.

188 See Babcock, 27 Stan L Rev 545 (cited in note 177).
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One may wonder whether the identification of people as "three
dollar bills" is shaped by the lawyers' prejudices and to what extent intuitions not capable of verbalization should be credited. On
the assumption that lawyers and judges can accurately identify
"three dollar bill jurors," however, devices other than the peremptory challenge could keep these jurors' actions from infecting jury
verdicts. For one thing, current standards for exclusion for cause
might be altered. Without requiring a finding of partiality, these
standards might permit the exclusion of any juror whose ability or
fairness appeared open to doubt. In addition, the Supreme Court
has upheld the constitutionality of nonunanimous jury verdicts in
state criminal cases-a procedure that denies idiosyncratic jurors
the ability to frustrate the judgments of others.1 89
Finally, following the voir dire examination of a somewhat
larger number of prospective jurors than the number to be empaneled, a trial judge might be permitted to select on a discretionary basis those jurors who appeared best qualified to decide the
case impartially. If the judge saw no reason to doubt any prospective juror's ability or fairness, the judge might use a random selection process instead, and someone not included on the jury might
be left unaware whether chance or judgment had led to his or her
exclusion. 190
This procedure might be characterized as affording peremptory challenges to the judge rather than to counsel, but the characterization would not be entirely accurate. A judge would not be
empowered to dismiss a juror for any reason that struck his or her
fancy (for example, disapproval of the juror's necktie or gender),
but only to make comparative evaluations of the ability and fairness of prospective jurors. The judge's responsibility would not differ from that of any other official authorized to make hiring decisions on a discretionary basis; and although a partisan or biased
judge could abuse his or her power, discretionary hiring does not

""See Apodaca v Oregon, 406 US 404 (1972). Were the abolition of peremptory challenges to lead to an increased use of nonunanimous jury verdicts, I confess that I would not
regard the change as progress. Jury unanimity reinforces the sense that criminal convictions
manifest a high degree of certainty of guilt, a sense that furthers the criminal law's ability to
fulfill its distinctive mission. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the CriminalLaw, 23 L &
Contemp Probs 401, 402-06 (1958).
190This "masking" procedure might not always be necessary, however. A judge often
could voice the reason for his or her exclusion without insulting the excluded juror: "Mr.
Smith, I have no doubt that you could judge this case fairly; but because you were the
victim of a serious crime ten years ago and because I cannot be sure that the trial won't
resurrect some difficult memories for you, I've decided that it would be better to let other
jurors hear this case."

The University of Chicago Law Review

[56:153

violate the Constitution. The discretion of a judge to select capable
and impartial jurors would be likely to advance the public's interest in securing a capable and impartial jury; the exercise of
peremptory challenges by advocates who seek favorable rather
than impartial jurors cannot be expected to further this goal. Affording judges a greater discretion in the selection of jurors than
they now possess would have a rational basis that current procedures lack. If "three dollar bill jurors" can be identified and should
in fact be excluded, the Constitution permits an impartial judicial
officer to exclude them.
Abolishing the peremptory challenge might require courts to
consider challenges for cause more carefully and to uphold them
more frequently, and the line-drawing process could become more
difficult than ruling on challenges for cause is today. Were a court
to reject a Klansman's claim that he could fairly judge the case of
a black defendant, the court might confront a similar challenge to
the impartiality of a member of a social organization (perhaps the
Elks Club) that excludes blacks from membership. A court also
might confront claims that a member of the National Organization
for Marihuana Legalization could not fairly try a drug-possession
case, that a person wearing a button or a jacket with a peace symbol could not fairly try a draft-evasion case, and that a reputed
member of a street gang could not fairly serve in any case. Submerging some issues in the ambiguity of the peremptory challenge
could be useful.191
In an adversary system, however, peremptory challenges cannot be confined to cases in which they permit judges to avoid difficult issues and in which they permit appropriately excluded jurors
to save face. Preserving the peremptory challenge as a face-saving
device in cases close to the line of appropriate exclusion for cause
guarantees irrational and invidious discrimination in countless
cases far from the line.
When discretion is likely to be abused, the Supreme Court
sometimes has interpreted the Constitution to forbid the exercise
of discretion. The Court held in Delaware v Prouse,92 for example,
that random stops of motorists to check drivers' licenses are unconstitutional. It noted at the same time that stopping all motorists at roadblocks would "not involve the unconstrained exercise of
discretion" and therefore might not violate the Fourth Amend-

191
192

See Babcock, 27 Stan L Rev at 553-54 (cited in note 177).
440 US 648 (1979).
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ment.193 With some exceptions, the Court has treated nondiscretionary administrative standards as indispensable to the constitutionality of administrative searches."" Similarly, the Court has
held that ordinances requiring permits for parades, for the distribution of literature, or for other forms of speech are unconstitutional unless they supply standards to guard against the denial of
permits for impermissible reasons. Although no licensing official
might have abused his or her discretion, the Court has concluded
that the danger posed by standardless ordinances is too great.195
The danger of unconstitutional abuse posed by the exercise of
peremptory challenges by partisan advocates is probably greater
than that posed by the discretion of officials to make random license checks or to grant parade permits without standards. Even
racial discrimination is unlikely to yield to the cumbersome, costly,
and easily evaded controls created by the Batson decision, and efforts to restrict countless other forms of discrimination through
Batson-like procedures would be hopeless. In addressing discrimination against women, the handicapped, and other groups (including, perhaps, jurors with thin lips who rarely smile), courts might
consider the adequacy of prima facie showings, assess the adequacy
of proffered explanations, and order expensive but largely ineffective remedies on a case-by-case basis. Were courts to undertake
this task, however, they might be too busy to undertake many
others.
Few peremptory challenges could survive even rational basis
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. These challenges are
not worth saving. The amount of protective buffering in a prophylactic rule prohibiting the peremptory challenge altogether would
be small and the costs of this rule minimal.'9 6 The gains would
include substantial economic savings, the effective control of racial
and other widely condemned forms of group discrimination, and
the control of countless other, less frequently employed, less generalized classifications that insult and diminish human beings.

193

Id at 663.

194 See, for example, Camara v Municipal Court, 387 US 523, 538 (1967) (requiring

"reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an area inspection" to
search for building code violations).
195 See, for example, Lovell v Griffin, 303 US 444 (1938); Shuttlesworth v Birmingham,
394 US 147, 150-51 (1969). See generally David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic
Rules, 55 U Chi L Rev 190 (1988).
1" See Rakas v Illinois,439 US 128, 147 (1978) ("Where the factual premises for a rule
are so generally prevalent that little would be lost and much would be gained by abandoning
case-by-case analysis, we have not hesitated to do so.").
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In his concurring opinion in Batson, Justice Marshall quoted a
manual formerly used to instruct Dallas, Texas, prosecutors in the
art of jury selection. 197 The person who leaked a copy of this confidential manual to the source cited by Justice Marshall 9 8 also
leaked a copy to me. Some excerpts may help to place the constitutional issue in context:
You are not looking for a fair juror, but rather a strong, biased
and sometimes hypocritical individual who believes that Defendants are different from them in kind, rather than degree.
You are not looking for any member of a minority group
which may subject him to oppression-they almost always
empathize with the accused. You are not looking for the free
thinkers and flower children.
Observation is worthwhile. Look at the panel out in the hall
before they are seated. You can often spot the showoffs and
the liberals by how and to whom they are talking. Observe the
veniremen as they walk into the courtroom. You can tell almost as much about a man by how he walks, as how he talks.
Look for physical afflictions. These people usually sympathize
with the accused.
I don't like women jurors because I can't trust them. They do,
however, make the best jurors in cases involving crimes
against children. It is possible that their "women's intuition"
can help you if you can't win your case with the facts....
Extremely overweight people, especially women and
young men, indicates a lack of self-discipline and often times
instability. I like the lean and hungry look.
If the veniremen have not lived in the county long, ask
where they were born and reared. People from small towns
and rural areas generally make good State's jurors. People
from the east or west coasts often make bad jurors .....
Intellectuals such as teachers, etc. generally are too liberal
and contemplative to make good State's jurors ....

197

476 US at 104 (Marshall concurring).

198 Texas Observer 9 (May 11, 1973).
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Ask if the venireman has any hobbies or interests that occupy
their spare time. Active, outdoors type hobbies indicate the
best State's jurors. Hunters always make good State's jurors.
Ask men if they have ever served in the military; if so, when,
what branch of the service, their rank upon discharge and if
they saw combat. Marines, master sargeants and those that
have seen combat generally make good State's jurors.
Ask veniremen their religious preference. Jewish veniremen
generally make poor State's jurors. Jews have a history of oppression and generally empathize with the accused. Lutherans
and Church of Christ veniremen usually make good State's
jurors.199
This training manual probably did not capture the practices of
most prosecutors when it was written fifteen years ago, and one
hopes that times have changed. Although much of the manual
seems ridiculous, the ridicule should not be directed primarily to
prosecutors, the Dallas District Attorney's Office, or even the manual's author. A more appropriate object of this ridicule is the
peremptory challenge itself. In selecting juries, defense attorneys
behave like prosecutors in reverse; and when a trial lawyer must
exercise peremptory challenges on the basis of limited information,
crude, insulting stereotypes may provide as plausible a basis for
action as any that he or she has.
Within broad limits, setting aside only the manual's most outrageous propositions, a prosecutor who follows its suggestions does
what the regime of peremptory challenges invites and encourages
him or her to do and indeed all but ensures that he or she will do.
In the United States, a legal institution that leads people to view
other people in the terms revealed by this manual and to make
governmental decisions on the bases it suggests cannot be
constitutional.
IV. THE REVIEW OF JURY

VERDICTS

A. The Judicial Acceptance of Inconsistent Verdicts
Just as our courtroom procedures often treat jurors as children, our rules concerning the review of jury verdicts suggest that
I' Jon Sparling, Jury Selection in a Criminal Case (unpublished, undated) (lettering
and headings omitted) (on file, University of Chicago Law Review office).
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jurors cannot be held to adult standards of responsibility. The
practice of accepting inconsistent jury verdicts illustrates our exemption of jurors from the review customarily afforded other governmental officials. A court may instruct a jury, for example, not to
convict a defendant of conspiracy unless the Government proves
that the defendant not only agreed to commit a crime but actually
committed it; the substantive offense may be the only overt act in
furtherance of the conspiracy that the Government has alleged. If
the jury convicts the defendant of conspiracy but at the same time
acquits him or her of the substantive offense, its inconsistent verdicts reveal either a misunderstanding or a violation of the court's
instructions. Nevertheless, the federal courts and most state courts
simply enter judgment on the verdicts. 0 0
Courts justify their toleration of jury inconsistency by presuming that the jurors disregarded their oaths and chose to be merciful
rather than just. The jurors presumably recognized the defendant's
guilt of the crime of which they acquitted but concluded that a
single conviction was enough. Frequently, however, a hypothesis
less flattering to the jurors' intelligence would be as plausible: The
jurors misunderstood rather than defied the court's instructions.
The jurors might have thought, for example, that a defendant
could appropriately be convicted of conspiracy upon proof of
agreement without proof of any overt act. On the jury's view of the
facts, the defendant might not have been guilty of any crime.
Rejecting substantial authority to the contrary,2 1 the Supreme Court adopted the rule upholding inconsistent jury verdicts
in 1932 in Dunn v United States.0 2 Offering the standard rationale for the rule, Justice Holmes quoted the language of a lower
court:
"The most that can be said in such cases is that the verdict
shows that either in the acquittal or the conviction the jury
did not speak their real conclusions, but that does not show
that they were not convinced of the defendant's guilt. We interpret the acquittal as no more than their assumption of a
power which they had no right to exercise, but to which they
''20 3
were disposed through lenity.

200

See LaFave and Israel, Criminal Procedure §23.7(e) at 48-49 (cited in note 121);

United States v Powell, 469 US 57 (1984).
201 See Dunn v United States, 284 US 390, 400-07 (1932) (Butler dissenting) (citing
and describing cases).
202

Id.

202 Id at 393 (quoting Steckler v United States, 7 F2d 59, 60 (2d Cir 1925)).
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In other words, rather than guard against unlawful conviction,
courts will presume unlawful acquittal. If either a conviction or an
acquittal must be erroneous, courts will assume that the error lies
in the acquittal alone. The message of Dunn seems to be: Better
that ten innocent defendants be convicted than that ten guilty defendants be denied the boon of unlawful jury nullification on some
counts of their multiple count indictments.
By 1984, lower federal courts had created several exceptions to
the Dunn rule. The Supreme Court therefore reexamined this rule
in United States v Powell.210 In his opinion for the Court, Justice
Rehnquist rejected the lower courts' exceptions, reiterated Justice
Holmes' argument for the rule, and added a rationale of his own.
"Inconsistent verdicts," he wrote, "present a situation where 'error,' in the sense that the jury has not followed the court's instructions, most certainly has occurred, but it is unclear whose ox has
been gored."2 0 5 If a defendant's acquittal of one crime rather than
his or her conviction of another was erroneous,
the Government has no recourse if it wishes to correct the
jury's error; the Government is precluded from appealing or
otherwise upsetting such an acquittal by the Constitution's
Double Jeopardy Clause..... .Given th[e] uncertainty [of
whether the defendant or the government has profited from
the error] and the fact that the Government is precluded from
challenging the acquittal, it is hardly satisfactory to allow the
defendant to receive a new trial on the conviction as a matter
of course.20 6
In other words, although a defendant's conviction might be erroneous, he or she may not challenge it because the framers of the
Constitution afforded him or her the protection of the Double
Jeopardy Clause (thereby precluding the Government from challenging the defendant's possibly erroneous acquittal). Seeking a
symmetry that the framers of the Double Jeopardy Clause failed to
provide, the Supreme Court hammered the defendant's shield into
the prosecutor's sword. Partly because of her constitutional privilege, the defendant in Powell went to prison; without it, she might
have been free.
Inconsistency in a jury's verdicts is usually apparent before a
court accepts these verdicts, and correction of the jury's error
204

469 US 57 (1984).

"' Id
204

Id.

at 65.
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could come at little cost. For many courts, however, correcting the
errors of juries is less important than indulging jury "vagaries."20
These courts recognize that their romanticized view of jury verdicts may not be accurate; but disregarding the possibility of factual mistake and the risk of unfair conviction, they treat the inconsistencies of juries as folk justice rather than as error. 08
B.

Judicial Review of the Sufficiency of the Evidence

Courts also defer to irrational jury determinations of fact. In
assessing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction,
they employ a standard that, if they meant it, would amply guard
against unjust conviction. A conviction may not stand when "a reasonably minded jury must necessarily have entertained a reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt."2 09 This rule, however, is hedged
with subordinate rules that sharply limit the power of judges:
All reasonable inferences which tend to support the Government's case must be accepted. Any conflicts in the evidence
must be resolved in the Government's favor .... "It is not
properly the function of the court ...to assess the credibility
of witnesses, weigh the evidence, or substitute its own judg2 10
ment as to the guilt or innocence for that of the jury.
On this view, courts look exclusively to the government's side of
the case and ask whether the prosecutor presented some evidence
of every element necessary to establish the offense charged. 11
They disregard evidence presented by the defendant unless it fills
gaps left by the prosecutor.
For example, in a case in which a defendant has been found in
possession of a stolen automobile and charged with knowingly receiving stolen property, the state's case may depend entirely on the
testimony of an admitted car thief who claims to have lent the automobile to the defendant, informing him of its stolen character.
See United States v Dotterweich, 320 US 277, 279 (1943).
Appellate courts ordinarily do not permit trial judges to render inconsistent judgments in cases tried without juries. See United States v Maybury, 274 F2d 899, 902-903 (2d
Cir 1960); Lafave and Israel, Criminal Procedure §23.7(e) 48-49 (cited in note 121). Nevertheless, at least in some circumstances, a state may allow trial judges to render inconsistent
judgments without violating the Constitution. See Harris v Rivera, 454 US 339, 346-47
(1981).
219 See, for example, United States v Palmere, 578 F2d 105, 106 (5th Cir 1978).
21 United States v Burns, 597 F2d 939, 941 (5th Cir 1979) (quoting United States v
Brown, 587 F2d 187, 190-91 (5th Cir 1979)).
2" See, for example, United States v Beck, 615 F2d 441, 448 (7th Cir 1980).
207
208
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This witness may have changed his story frequently; he may have
exculpated the defendant on several prior occasions; he may have a
long history of crimes of dishonesty; the government may have offered him leniency in exchange for his testimony; and his testimony may be uncorroborated by other circumstances. Nevertheless, because the assessment of credibility is for the jury, his
evidence is legally sufficient to support the defendant's conviction.
Similarly, a victim's initial identification of a defendant may
have been obtained under suggestive circumstances; the defendant
may not have matched the physical description that the victim
gave the police following the crime; the defendant may have offered an alibi and supported it with the testimony of an apparently
disinterested witness; and he also may have presented strong physical evidence corroborating his alibi. If, however, the victim has
positively identified the defendant, the evidence is sufficient to
support his conviction under customary standards. 12
To be sure, courts sometimes bend their stated standards in
extreme cases. Moreover, although courts may not assess the credibility of witnesses in judging the sufficiency of the evidence, they
may assess credibility in deciding whether to order new trials.
' 213
Their discretion to order new trials is to be exercised "sparingly
and only in "exceptional cases in which the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict. 2 1 4 Nevertheless, a second jury
may return the same verdict as the first; and in this situation, a
judge is likely to disregard the fact that the evidence still "preponderates against the verdict" and send to prison a defendant whom
the judge believes to be innocent.215
During most of the history of the common law, the power of
22 For a detailed description of a case like this one-a case in which a jury convicted,
in which the conviction was affirmed by an intermediate state appellate court, but in which
the state supreme court did not defer to the jury's determination of credibility-see my
paper, Walter V. Schaefer: An Appreciation, 32 U Chi L Sch Rec 62, 63-64 (1986).
213United States v Mancini, 396 F Supp 75, 78 (E D Pa 1975).
214 United States v Wilson, 178 F Supp 881, 884 (D DC 1959)(citation omitted.)
215 Id. A judge need not acquiesce in the verdict of a second jury, however. So long as
the evidence "preponderates heavily against the verdict," the judge may order a third trial,
a fourth, or a fifth. If a judge is willing to uphold only a verdict of acquittal, one wonders
why the judge may not order an acquittal directly. This question occurred to Judge Jack B.
Weinstein, who used a complex procedure to raise the issue in a form that enabled the
Second Circuit to resolve it. In an opinion by Judge Henry Friendly, the court ruled that
Judge Weinstein had no authority to order an acquittal or dismissal in a case in which the
principal government witness was unbelievable and there was no prospect that the government could present additional evidence at a second trial. Judge Weinstein apparently could,
however, grant new trials ad infinitum. United States v Weinstein, 452 F2d 704, 716 (2d Cir
1971).
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judges to guard against conviction of the innocent was substantially broader. Although common law judges could not formally direct verdicts of acquittal, they gave jurors their views of the facts
as well as the law, and their recommendations in favor of acquittal
were very likely to be followed. If, in a rare case, a jury disregarded
the judge's opinion, the judge could recommend a pardon with full
assurance that the Crown would grant it as a matter of course. 1 '
The historic struggle for jury independence in England focused on
the efforts of judges to force conviction and to punish jurors who
acquitted for rendering verdicts contrary to the evidence. The
judges' practical power to free defendants
whose guilt they
21 7
doubted was not a source of controversy.
In the early part of the twentieth century, courts sometimes
manifested a stronger sense of their responsibility to ensure the
guilt of the people whom they punished than judges do today:
[It is] the duty of the trial court to carefully weigh and consider all the evidence and the facts and circumstances in the
case, and unless satisfied with the verdict to such an extent
that its reason and judgment approve it, a new trial should be
granted. And "the approval of a verdict does not mean ...
formal approval ... but ... the assent and approval of the
mind after due consideration; and when the mind of the court
refuses to concur in the correctness of a verdict, and its honest
convictions lead it to believe that it ought to have been for the
other party, then the verdict is not supported by the evidence
so as to merit its approval.... It cannot be said that a court
approves a verdict when its reason and judgment rebel against
the conclusion it expresses. .. ." "[I]t is the imperative, abiding duty of the court ... to carefully weigh the entire matter,
and, unless it is satisfied that the verdict is responsive to the
demands of justice, to set the verdict aside and grant a new
trial.. . ." [T]he trial court should... entertain a firm belief
in the justness of the verdict before pronouncing judgment." 8
216

See John H. Langbein, The Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers, 45 U Chi L Rev

263, 296 (1978); Green, Verdict According to Conscience at 139-40 (cited in note 52); Weinstein, 452 F2d at 715 (collecting sources).
217 See generally Green, Verdict According to Conscience at 150-152 (cited in note 52).
218 Piel v People, 52 Colo 1, 7-10, 119 P 687, 689-90 (1911) (quoting Yarnell v Kilgore,
15 Old 591, 593, 82 P 990 (1905) and Hogan v Bailey, 27 Okla 15, 110 P 890, 892 (1910)).
But see St. Louis v People, 120 Colo 345, 353, 209 P2d 538, 541 (1949) ("In the opinion in
the Piel case there is language which might justify one in assuming that we held that the
trial judge is a super thirteenthjuror vested with the power and authority of determining
whether the jury has reached a proper verdict upon conflicting evidence ... , but we do not
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Although the standard of review suggested by this language
may be too stringent, today's broad deference to jury determinations of credibility is also unwarranted. The appropriate standard
is the one generally accepted-whether a reasonable jury could
have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, courts
should apply this standard after reviewing all the evidence in a
case, including that presented by the defendant. To the extent that
determinations of credibility appropriately rest on the demeanor of
witnesses, judges should defer to jury determinations of credibility;
but to the extent that fair determinations of credibility rest on
more objective circumstances, courts need not exempt the assessment of credibility from review.2 1
Appellate judges frequently note the dangers of basing their
review on a "cold" record, suggesting that "even the best and most
accurate record of oral testimony is like 'a dehydrated peach; it has
neither the substance nor the flavor of the peach before it was
dried.' ,,220 The importance of demeanor evidence is often overstated, however, and few appellate judges have proposed the use of
videotape technology to enable them to review witness testimony
in color.
The assessment of credibility is not a mystical process that
must be left to the intuitions of unreviewed, hopefully clairvoyant
jurors. The task depends less on the ability of jurors to stare
deeply into a witness's eyes than it does on the jurors' ability to
judge the internal coherency of the witness's story, its consistency
with known external circumstances, and the witness's past conduct, statements and character. Judicial review on the basis of a
"cold" record has its virtues and can safeguard at least part of this
process. The opportunity to leave the emotions of the closing argu-

so construe it."); People v Emeson, 179 Colo 308, 312, 500 P2d 368, 369-71 (1972) ("It is
elemental that a trial judge may never upset a guilty verdict for the sole reason that if he
were the finder of fact, he would have ruled differently. If the evidence, although conflicting,
supports the jury's verdict of guilty, the verdict must be upheld.").
The language quoted in text did not reflect the dominant view of early twentieth century courts. As recently as 1957, however, one commentator noted that "a small and waning
number of courts have suggested that submission of a case to the jury is improper unless the
only conclusion which the evidence permits is that of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."
Comment, Judgments of Acquittal: The Right to a Non-Jury Trial, 24 U Chi L Rev 561,
564 (1957).
2'1 A court might assume that all prosecution witnesses spoke with poise and self-assurance while all defense witnesses had sweaty palms, quavering voices, and shifty eyes. If a
reasonable jury would nevertheless have had a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt, the
court should not permit a verdict of guilty to stand.
220 State v Gilmore, 103 NJ 508, 511 A2d 1150, 1170-71 (1986) (Clifford dissenting)
(quoting Trusky v Ford Motor Co, 19 NJ Super 100, 104, 88 A2d 235 (1952)).
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ments behind, to escape the interplay of courtroom personalities,
and to sort out times, places, and contradictions in a relatively leisurely fashion can yield important insights. Judges have no higher
responsibility than ensuring that the innocent are not punished for
crime; and the careful judicial review of jury findings, including
those turning on jury assessments of credibility, can contribute to
this goal.
C. The Courts' Refusal to Permit the Impeachment of Jury Verdicts by Jurors
The refusal of courts to allow jurors to "impeach" their verdicts by confessing misconduct illustrates once more our failure to
hold jurors to ordinary standards of responsibility. In Tanner v
United States,221 the Supreme Court excluded a voluntary confession of serious misconduct and revealed its sympathy for the view
that adolescents will be adolescents and so will jurors.
On their own initiative, two of the jurors in Tanner approached the defense attorney shortly after the jury had convicted
two federal co-defendants of conspiracy and mail fraud. The jurors' statements, taken together,2 2 suggested that the foreperson
of the jury was an alcoholic who regularly drank a liter of wine
during the court's noon recess. Two other jurors consumed mixed
drinks. Four preferred beer, drinking one to three pitchers together
during midday breaks. In a sworn statement, one member of this
group reported that, although.their drinking did not make the jurors "drunk," some were "falling asleep all the time during the
trial.

2 23

This juror confessed that his own reasoning ability was

affected on one day of the trial.
In addition, the juror reported that he and three others had
smoked marihuana on "just about every day" of the trial. He
added that a juror had sold a quarter pound of marihuana to another during the trial; that two had snorted "a couple lines" of cocaine on several occasions; that these same jurors sometimes had
221

107 S Ct 2739 (1987).

222

The juror who first approached the defense attorney apparently had not partici-

pated in the misconduct that she described. Although her statement was consistent with

that of a second juror who confessed his own misconduct, the second juror's statement was
more dramatic and complete. Most of the allegations described in text proceeded from the
second juror. Id at 2744-45.
222 Id at 2750. The other juror-informant also reported that several of the drinking jurors had slept through the afternoons of the trial. During the trial, the defense attorney had
called the judge's attention to the fact that "a couple of jurors in particular have been taking long naps." Id at 2744. The judge himself, however, did not see any juror asleep.
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used alcohol, cocaine, and marihuana together; and that one juror
had "talked about how he was flying"-a statement indicating to
the informant that the juror was "messed up." This informant
characterized the trial as "one big party."22
The issue in Tanner was not whether these allegations should
have led to a new trial but only whether the trial court should have
conducted a hearing at which other jurors could be heard.22 5 To
this question, the Supreme Court just said no.
1.
Rule.

The Court's Interpretation of the Governing Federal

The Supreme Court relied on Federal Rule of Evidence
606(b), which it described as "grounded in the common-law rule
against admission of jury testimony to impeach a verdict .... 226
The Federal Rule, however, does not prohibit jurors from impeaching their verdicts. As the Advisory Committee Note on the Rule
explains, "The familiar rubric that a juror may not impeach his
own verdict.., is a gross oversimplification.... [S]imply putting
verdicts beyond effective reach can only promote irregularity and
injustice. '227 Moreover, as the four dissenting Justices in Tanner
observed, the terms of the Rule do not apply to allegations of objective misconduct occurring prior to a jury's deliberations.2 2 8
Rule 606(b) contains two prohibitions. Subject to some exceptions, it first prohibits a juror from testifying "to any matter or
statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations."
This language plainly does not restrict testimony concerning drug

224

Id at 2745.

225One of the juror-informants had named another juror who, she said, would confirm

her allegations of misconduct; but the trial judge had denied the defense counsel permission
to interview this juror or any of the others. The Supreme Court complained that defense
counsel had "clearly violat[ed]" the court's order by taking a formal statement from a juror
shortly after this juror had contacted the attorney on the juror's own initiative. Id at 2750.
It said that "on this basis alone" the trial judge could have disregarded the juror's statement. The Court thereby took a more favorable view of the exclusion of probative but improperly obtained evidence than it has taken in other contexts. See, for example, United
States v Leon, 468 US 897, 916-919 (1984) (in the absence of misconduct by police officers,
the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule does not reach the products of even deliberate
constitutional violations by magistrates and judges). One wonders whether the defense attorney in Tanner acted in "objectively reasonable good faith" in concluding that the court's
order did not preclude taking an affidavit from a juror who had come forward without
prompting.
"" 107 S Ct at 2748.
227 Advisory Committee's Note, FRE 606(b) (in Jack B. Weinstein, et al, eds, Evidence:
Rules and Statute Supplement 58 (Foundation, 1984)).
228

Id at 2757.
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or alcohol abuse that has occurred prior to a jury's deliberations.
Second, the Rule forbids a juror's testimony concerning "the
affect of anything upon his or any other juror's mind or emotions
as influencing him to assent or to dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning his mental processes in connection therewith." Subject to the Rule's exceptions, this language probably
prohibits a juror's testimony concerning the effect of alcohol or
drug abuse on the juror's attentiveness or on his or her other
mental processes, but it does not restrict testimony concerning the
alcohol and drug abuse itself. In this respect, the Rule embodies a
distinction that has found frequent expression in American cases.
For example, an opinion by Justice Brennan during his service on
the New Jersey Supreme Court declared that the testimony of jurors should be received when it "goes, not to the motives or methods or processes by which they reached the verdict, but merely
'
to . . . the occurrence of events bearing on the verdict."229
The Supreme Court did not explain how the language of the
Federal Rule could be construed to reach testimony concerning alcohol and drug abuse that had occurred prior to a jury's deliberations.23 0 Instead the Court focused on an exception to the Rule's
prohibitions: "[A] juror may testify on the question . . . whether
any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror."23 1 The Court ruled that alcohol, marihuana and cocaine were

229

The opinion added:

Evidence of the actual effect of the extraneous matter upon jurors' minds can and
should be excluded, as such evidence implicates their mental processes, but receiving
their evidence as to ... the happening of the event... supplies evidence which can be
put to the test of other testimony... and... can serve to avert... a grave miscarriage
of justice, which it is certainly the first duty of a court of conscience to prevent if at all
possible.
State v Kociolek, 20 NJ 92, 100, 118 A2d 812, 816 (1955). For a court to permit testimony
concerning an event whose relevance depends on its tendency to prejudice jurors while forbidding any testimony concerning whether the prejudicial effect materialized seems odd.
The position articulated by Justice Brennan reflected the dubious application of a generally
plausible doctrine-one forbidding juror testimony about subjective error or misconduct unconfirmed by objective circumstances (testimony, for example, concerning a juror's subjective misunderstanding of appropriate jury instructions). Although the view articulated by
Justice Brennan and later adopted by the Federal Rule was a minority position, it had been
accepted in some jurisdictions since the mid-nineteenth century. See, for example, Wright v
Illinois & Miss. Tel. Co., 20 Iowa 195, 210-12 (1866); Perry v Bailey, 12 Kan 539, 544-45
(1874) (jurors may testify concerning "those things which are matters of sight and hearing"
but not'concerning their subjective mental processes-this rule permits a juror's testimony
concerning another juror's intoxication).
230 The Court did indicate that counsel had not raised this issue. 107 S Ct at 2748.
231

FRE 606(b).
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not "outside influences."2 "2
2. The Incongruity and Unfairness of the Rule Forbidding
the Impeachment of Jury Verdicts.
The common law rule to which the Supreme Court referred in
Tanner was not the rule during most of the history of the common
law.2 33 This rule originated in a decision by Lord Mansfield shortly
before the framing of the American Constitution. In Vaise v Delaval,234 Mansfield rejected the affidavits of two members of a jury
that the jury had reached its verdict by lottery. Mansfield nevertheless observed hypothetically that the testimony of a person who
had "seen the transaction through a window" could be received.
As Dean Wigmore observed, Vaise v Delaval apparently rested
on a civil law maxim of which Mansfield was especially fond: "A
witness shall not be heard to allege his own turpitude."2 35 Following Mansfield's service on the Court of King's Bench, courts
quickly repudiated this maxim in most areas of law. 23 6 The princi232 107 S Ct at 2750. At the time of the Tanner decision, two leading commentaries on
the Federal Rules of Evidence had concluded that the exception to Rule 606(b) would permit jurors to testify to intoxication even within the jury room. See David Louisell and Christopher Mueller, 3 Federal Evidence § 289 at 143-144 (Law Co-op, 1979) ("[Tlhe present
exception paves the way for proof by the affidavit or testimony of a juror that one or more
jurors became intoxicated during deliberations."); Jack B. Weinstein and Margaret A. Berger, 3 Weinstein's Evidence §606[04] (Foundation, 1985) ("Rule 606(b) would not render a
witness incompetent to testify to juror irregularities such as intoxication."). See also Note,
Pre-DeliberationsJuror Misconduct, Evidential Incompetence and Juror Responsibility,
99 Yale L J 187 (1988).
232 See John Henry Wigmore, 8 Evidence § 2352 at 696-97 nn 2 & 3 (McNaughton rev)
(Little, Brown 1961) (describing early English and American cases in which courts had received jurors' affidavits of misconduct without question).
231 1 Term Rpts 11 (KB 1785).
211 "Nemo turpitudinem suam allegans audietur." See Wigmore,8 Evidence 696 (cited
in note 233). One of the jurors who approached the defense attorney in Tanner reported
misconduct by other jurors, not herself. At least as originally formulated, the common law
rule would not have excluded her testimony, for she did not "allege her own turpitude."
Lord Mansfield's far-reaching argument for excluding admissions of wrongdoing was
simply that an admitted wrongdoer is unworthy of belief. If taken seriously, this argument
would have required courts to exclude all confessions of crime.
231 Just as they repudiated other aspects of Lord Mansfield's work. See Grant Gilmore,
The Ages of American Law 7-8 (Yale, 1977); W. S. Holdsworth, 8 A History of English Law
34-38 (Little, Brown, 1926). Lord Mansfield had pressed his favorite civil law maxim into
the service of a long-sustained campaign to make virtually all commercial promises enforceable. He had ruled that a person who had signed a commercial instrument could not assert
its invalidity on grounds of usury, for doing so would allege this person's own turpitude.
Walton v Shelly, 1 Term Rpts 296, 300 (KB 1786). This application of the doctrine lasted
twelve years. See Jordainev Lashbrooke, 7 Term Rpts 601, 603 (KB 1798) (Kenyon); John
Henry Wigmore, 2 Evidence: Trials at Common Law, § 529 at 739 (Chadbourn rev) (Little,
Brown 1979).
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ple nevertheless persisted to forbid jurors from impeaching their
verdicts. In Wigmore's words, "supposed new reasons of policy
2 37
were found. 1
Wigmore noted the incongruity of admitting the testimony of
a "bailiff whose shameless [intrusion] upon [the jury's] privacy
forms his only qualification as a witness" while "sanctimoniously
23
put[ting] away the juryman who reports his own misconduct.
Our law regards admissions of wrongdoing as generally trustworthy,23 9 and accepting responsibility for one's misconduct is regarded as an admirable rather than a regrettable act. In Vaise v
Delaval, the Court inverted the usual principles of law and everyday morality. Moreover, Mansfield's rule presented other incongruities as well.
As applied both historically and today in the states that retain
it, the rule is one-sided. It prohibits jurors from burying their verdicts but not from praising them. Thus, in a case in which a bailiff
or other nonjuror alleges misconduct by a jury, the rule permits
jurors to deny this misconduct but not to confess it.2 40 A rule that
makes admissibility depend solely on whether a witness says what
officialdom wishes to hear-one that admits a witness's testimony
when it favors the state but not when it favors the defendant-violates basic principles of impartiality. Despite its historic
pedigree, the rule is probably unconstitutional.2 4 1
"I Wigmore, 8 Evidence § 2352 at 696 (cited in note 233). For a discussion of these
"supposed new reasons of policy," see text at notes 249-57.
Id § 2353 at 699.
239 Most notably, an exception to the hearsay rule admits declarations against interest
even when made by people who were unsworn and not subject to cross-examination. See, for
example, United States v Matlock, 415 US 164 (1979). See also United States v Harris,403
US 573, 583 (1971) (plurality opinion) ("Admissions of crime, like admissions against proprietary interest, carry their own indicia of credibility-sufficient at least to support a finding of probable cause to search."). Most admissions of juror misconduct do not fall within
the traditional hearsay exceptions for declarations against penal and proprietary interest. As
the Tanner case illustrates, however, some do. Moreover, even when a juror's admission
does not fall within the hearsay exceptions, it reveals personally embarrassing information
and is apparently offered for the purpose of benefiting a wronged litigant rather than the
juror himself or herself.
2'0See, for example, Smith v Illinois Valley Ice Cream Co., 20 I1 App 2d 312, 156
NE2d 361 (1959); State v Holt, 79 SD 50, 51-52, 107 NW2d 732, 733 (1961); Wigmore, 8
Evidence § 2354 at 714 and nn 9, 10 (cited in note 233) (collecting cases).
241 See Wardius v Oregon, 412 US 470, 474 (1973) (unanimous ruling that a state may
not obtain discovery from a defendant without affording him or her an opportunity to obtain similar discovery from the state-"although the Due Process Clause has little to say
regarding the amount of discovery which the parties must be afforded,... it does speak to
the balance of forces . . . ."); Washington v Texas, 388 US 14 (1967) (a state rule that does
not preclude a criminal from testifying against an alleged accomplice but that does preclude
him or her from testifying in favor of the alleged accomplice violates the Compulsory Pro-
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Moreover, as the Supreme Court noted in Tanner, Mansfield's
rule, like the current Federal Rule, is subject to an important exception; jurors may testify to "extraneous" or "outside" influences
that could have affected their deliberations.2 42 In some situations,
this exception may be mandated by the Sixth Amendment right to
confront one's accusers. 243 The scope of the exception has proven
problematic, and its application has yielded strange results.
Some courts have held, for example, that when a juror consults a dictionary to learn the meaning of terms used in the court's
instructions, the dictionary is an improper "outside influence."
The juror's testimony therefore can be received and the verdict set
aside.24 Had the juror known or misunderstood the meaning of the
words used by the court at the time that he or she heard them,
cess Clause of the Sixth Amendment); Pennsylvania v Ritchie, 480 US 39, 51-61 (1987) (the
Due Process Clause entitles a defendant to limited pretrial discovery of the records of a
state agency so long as these records are available to courts and law enforcement personnel).
Were the rule against "impeachment" of a person's own actions extended to officials other
than jurors-for example, by precluding police officers from testifying to their unlawful
searches or other violations of the Constitution while permitting them to deny allegations of
civil rights violations made by others-courts probably would hold the rule unconstitutional
without hesitation.
Unlike the traditional rule forbidding the impeachment of verdicts by jurors, Federal
Rule of Evidence 606(b) does not make admissibility depend on which party the testimony
favors. The Rule's evenhandedness sometimes causes it to work as unfairly to the state as it
does to defendants. In Stockton v Virginia, 852 F2d 740 (4th Cir 1988), the Fourth Circuit
noted that proof of an unauthorized and potentially prejudicial communication with jurors
requires the government to demonstrate that the communication was harmless. In Stockton,
however, in which a restaurant owner had urged some jurors dining in his restaurant to "fry
the son of a bitch," Rule 606(b) prevented the jurors from testifying that they had not in
fact been influenced by this improper communication. Id at 742, 744-45. Although the Rule
plainly applied, a plausible reason for rejecting the jurors' testimony is difficult to envision.
Moreover, in light of the fact that the federal rule is not truly "evidentiary" (see text at
notes 249-50), its use in federal habeas corpus to prevent a state from proving the validity of
a state criminal proceeding is offensive.
21 107 S Ct at 2746.
213 See Parkerv Gladden, 385 US 363, 364 (1966) (bailiff's comment to a juror that the
defendant was guilty violated the Confrontation Clause); People v DeLucia, 20 NY2d 275,
229 NE2d 211, 214 (1967) (testimony that jurors had described their unauthorized view of a
crime scene admitted-the jurors' statements had made them un-cross-examined witnesses
against the defendant).
2'4 See, for example, Alvarez v People, 653 P2d 1127, 1131 (Colo 1982). But see id at
1133-35 (Rovira dissenting) (noting instances in which the Colorado Supreme Court had
consulted and cited dictionaries). Although newspaper stories describing relevant but
unadmitted evidence plainly qualify as "outside influences," some courts have concluded
that dictionaries, law books, and medical treatises do not. See Annotation, PrejudicialEffect of Jury's Procurement or Use of Book During Deliberations in Criminal Cases, 35
ALR4th 626 (1985). Compare Jones v Kemp, 44 Crim L Rptr 2428 (N D Ga 1989) (state
trial court committed constitutional error by permitting jurors in a capital case to consult
the Bible, but "the use by deliberating jurors of an extrajudicial code... already embodied
in their own characters" apparently would be permissible).

The University of Chicago Law Review

[56:153

however, his or her knowledge or misperception would have been
an internal rather than an external influence. The fact that this
knowledge or misperception would have proceeded from an extraneous source at some point in the juror's life would not have
mattered.
Similarly, were a juror to seek guidance from an astrologer
during the jury's deliberations, the astrologer would be an extraneous influence. Had the juror consulted the astrologer earlier and
gained sufficient information to obtain guidance from the stars on
his or her own, neither the astrologer nor the stars would have
been viewed as an outside source of information. (Courts have in
fact rejected testimony that jurors invoked astrology during their
deliberations and reported supernatural visions. 4 5 ) Both Mansfield's rule and Federal Rule 606(b) have led courts to focus on
issues of timing and on the internal or external locus of improper
sources of information. The rules have diverted courts from something that ought to be more important-the characterof the information, misinformation, mind-altering chemicals, and supernatural
visions that have led jurors to their verdicts.
In form, the rule against the impeachment of jury verdicts by
jurors is merely an evidentiary rule. One must look elsewhere to
discover the substantive grounds for setting jury verdicts aside.
Since the mid-nineteenth century, American courts have in fact
been divided on when proof of a juror's use of alcohol requires a
new trial. A minority of courts have held that any unauthorized
drinking even by a single juror requires a new trial and that inquiry into either the extent of this drinking or its effect is unnecessary.146 Most courts, however, have demanded some reason to be245 See United States v Dioguardi,492 F2d 70, 75 (2d Cir 1974) (juror wrote defendant
that she had "eyes and ears that.., see things before it happen," claiming that "a curse was
put on them some years ago"); State v DeMille, 756 P2d 81, 83 (Utah 1988) (juror claimed
that she had received a divine sign of the defendant's guilt); Hutchinson v Laughlin, 90
Ohio App 5, 102 NE2d 875 (1951) (astrological investigation by jury foreperson).
21 See, for example, State v Baldy, 17 Iowa 39, 43 (1864) ("The parties have a clear
right to the cool, dispassionate and unbiased judgment of each juror applied to the determination of the issues in the cause, and the use in any degree of that which stimulates the
passions and has a tendency to lessen the soundness of judgment, is itself conclusive evidence that the party who has the right to the exercise of that dispassionate judgment, has
been prejudiced in not having it as perfect as it existed in the juror when accepted . . .");
People v Schad, 58 Hun 571, 573-74, 12 NYS 695 (1891) ("[I]t is impossible for the court to
measure or estimate the effect of an alcoholic stimulant, which varies with the susceptibility
of the person by whom it is taken; it is enough that its well-known tendency is to produce
an abnormal elevation, and, in the reaction, a corresponding depression of the mind and a
consequent disturbance, in a greater or lesser degree of the reasoning powers."); Commonwealth v Fisher, 226 Pa 189, 196-97, 75a 204, 207 (1910) (defendant has a right to trial by
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lieve that the use of alcohol might have influenced the jury's
performance. As the Nevada Supreme Court stated the rule in
1872, "A judge... should never hesitate to set aside a verdict, in a
criminal case, where there is even a suspicion that any juror was in
the least affected by intoxicating liquor during the progress of the
trial or the deliberation upon the verdict. ' 24 7 Under any of the
standards that American courts have employed, the alcohol and
drug abuse described in Tanner would have
led to a new trial if
248
proven by witnesses other than the jurors.
As the Supreme Court noted in Tanner, one asserted objective
of Federal Rule 606(b) and of the rule against the impeachment of
jury verdicts by jurors is to promote the finality of jury verdicts.24 9
Nevertheless, finality is disrupted as much by proof of juror misconduct from eavesdroppers, bartenders, and drug dealers as by
proof from the jurors themselves. The evidentiary rules promote
finality in a haphazard, backhanded way, relying on the fact that
no one other than jurors usually is able to testify to their misconduct. Indeed, the claim that the rules promote finality strips away
their evidentiary costume. One avowed function of these supposedly evidentiary rules is simply to abrogate the substantive rules
that purport to entitle litigants to relief from improper jury
verdicts.
Considerations of finality might justify requirements of timeliness in filing motions for new trials and limitations of the substantive bases for setting jury verdicts aside. Our goal sometimes may
be: the right answer if possible but above all an answer. Nevertheless, after devoting substantial resources to the selection of an impartial jury, permitting lawyers to probe the private lives of prospective jurors in an effort to accomplish this goal, allowing
jurors who are "above suspicion of being intoxicated"). For a review of early decisions holding that "Courts will not inquire whether the juror was affected by what he drank" and that
"the only sure safeguard to the purity and correctness of the verdict is that no drinking
shall be allowed," see People v Gray, 61 Cal 164, 184 (1882).
'47State v Jones, 7 Nev 408, 414-15 (1872). See generally Annotation, Use of Intoxicating Liquor by Jurors: Criminal Cases, 7 ALR3d 1040 (1966).
248 The trial judge in Tanner in fact invited the defense attorney to present proof of
the jurors' drug and alcohol abuse from a source other than the jurors themselves. 107 S Ct
at 2744. During the nineteenth century, some courts invoked the rule against the impeachment of jury verdicts by jurors to preclude jurors from testifying to their own intoxication.
Other courts, however, did consider this testimony. See Perry v Bailey, 12 Kan 539, 544-45
(1874); March v State, 44 Tex 64, 84 (1875).
"' See 107 S Ct at 2747 ("Allegations of juror misconduct, incompetency, or inattentiveness, raised for the first time days, weeks, or months after the verdict seriously disrupt
the finality of the process."); Advisory Committee's Note, FRE 606(b) at 58 (cited in note
227).
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lawyers to challenge prospective jurors peremptorily because a
mysterious sixth sense may offer a hint of partisanship, wrangling
over evidentiary issues to ensure that jury verdicts rest on better
information than is employed in most of life's decisions, and debating and delivering lengthy instructions on the law, it is odd to
reject highly probative evidence that the process did not work. The
Tanner decision illustrates a central dynamic of American criminal
justice: Millions for procedure but not one dime for outcome.2 5
The Supreme Court argued in Tanner that rules forbidding
the impeachment of jury verdicts by jurors promote "full and
frank discussion in the jury room, jurors' willingness to return an
unpopular verdict, and the community's trust in a system that relies on the decisions of laypeople. ' ' 25 1 Again, however, the effect of
any revelation of jury misconduct on the quality of future jury deliberations and on the public's acceptance of jury verdicts seems
unaffected by whether the revelation comes from jurors or from
some other source.
Moreover, unlike grand jurors,2 52 petit jurors are under no legal obligation to preserve the confidentiality of their deliberations.
Jurors may (and do) tell newspaper reporters what transpired in
jury rooms, reenact their deliberations on television broadcasts,
and testify about these deliberations before legislative committees.25 3 If the prospect that jurors will recount the conduct of other
jurors in these forums does not inhibit frank discussion, discourage
jurors from taking unpopular stands, and undermine the public's
confidence in jury verdicts, it seems doubtful that the prospect of
disclosure in a court of law would do so. Our legal system fosters
confidentiality by forbidding disclosure only when disclosure would
save a defendant from wrongful punishment. We permit disclosure
for the sake of informing and entertaining the public and amusing
friends at cocktail parties.
Finally, the Tanner opinion argued that jurors would be
"harassed and beset" by defeated litigants if they were permitted
to testify to their misconduct.25 4 Alone among the arguments curTo be sure, our profligate procedures are mostly on paper; we provide trials to only a
small minority of defendants.
251 107 S Ct at 2748. Compare Glanville Williams, The Proof of Guilt: A Study of the
English CriminalTrial 268 (Stevens, 3d ed 1963) (Secrecy "preserve[s] public confidence in
a system which more intimate knowledge might destroy.").
252 See FRCrP 6(e).
252 See Note, Public Disclosures of Jury Deliberations,96 Harv L Rev 886 nn 4-5, 887
n 10 (1983).
"1 107 S Ct at 2747 (quoting McDonald v Pless, 238 US 264, 267-68 (1915)).
250
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rently offered for Mansfield's rule and its successors, this rationale
would not extend to the testimony of nonjurors. Nevertheless, a
more direct way to preclude harassment by lawyers and litigants
would be to forbid harassment by lawyers and litigants. Some
American jurisdictions currently require attorneys to obtain judicial leave before contacting jurors to discuss their verdicts; other
jurisdictions do not.25 With judicial leave or without it, lawyers
frequently approach jurors to conduct post-mortems." 6 Courts
might limit this practice without excluding the testimony of jurors
whose unsolicited allegations of misconduct apparently have proceeded from pangs of conscience-jurors like those in Tanner.
Moreover, if the prospect of obtaining proof of improper "external" influences like dictionaries and news broadcasts does not lead
lawyers and litigants to harass and beset jurors, it seems unlikely
that the prospect of obtaining proof of "internal" influences like
cocaine and marihuana would do so.
The justifications offered for the rule against the impeachment
of jury verdicts by jurors seem thin, and one may wonder whether
this rule has served other goals that courts have been reluctant to
avow. Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court in Tanner may
have hinted at these darker purposes:
There is little doubt that post-verdict investigation into juror
misconduct would in some instances lead to the invalidation
of verdicts reached after irresponsible or improper juror behavior. It is not at all clear, however,25that the jury system
could survive such efforts to perfect it. 1

This statement, if translated into forthright English, might
read, "We could not have a jury system if we faced the truth about
it. We want to have a jury system, and we will therefore hide the
truth." The refusal to know embodied in our rules may reflect
what we know already-that our system of jury controls frequently
fails. If verdicts could be set aside whenever jurors had misconstrued or defied the court's instructions, rendered compromise verdicts, considered for one purpose evidence admitted only for another, given substantial weight to evidence not admitted at all,
treated a defendant's failure to testify as evidence of guilt, or acted
"" See Annotation, Propriety of Attorney's Communications with Jurors After Trial,
19 ALR4th 1209, 1212 (1983).
"' See Marjorie Fargo, Make the Post-Trial Interview Work for You, 3 Crim Just 2
(Summer 1988).
267 107 S Ct at 2747.
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on the basis of manifest prejudice, substantial numbers of jury verdicts might not stand. 5
Perhaps what we say that we want juries to do and what we
truly want them to do are different things. On the one hand, we
tell juries to follow the law; on the other hand, when juries do not
follow the law, they serve the purposes of the jury system. Lawlessness in verdicts of acquittal, however, is more tolerable than lawlessness in verdicts of conviction.25 9 Refusing to punish people
whom the law declares punishable sometimes may thwart official
oppression; punishing people whom, on a fair determination of the
facts, the law would set free is not one of the jury system's virtues.
A legal system that would knowingly permit a drunken, dozing tribunal of the sort described in Tanner to send people to prison26 0
2 61
has little claim to respect.
Abandoning their hear-no-evil posture would require courts to
confront difficult questions of how much juror misconduct these
courts should endure.28 2 Refusing to face these questions, however,
258See Jerome Frank, Courts on Trial: Myth and Reality in American Justice 115
(Princeton, 1949); Fleming James, Jr. and Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Civil Procedure310 (Little, Brown, 2d ed 1977).
259 See, for example, United States v Scott, 437 US 82, 91 (1978) ("[T]he law attaches
particular significance to an acquittal. To permit a second trial after an acquittal, however
mistaken the acquittal may have been, would present an unacceptably high risk that the
Government... might wear down the defendant so that 'even though innocent, he may be
found guilty.'") (quoting Green v United States, 355 US 184, 188 (1957)).
260 Each of the defendants in Tanner was sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment. After
the Supreme Court's decision, however, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit vacated the defendants' convictions on grounds unrelated to the alleged jury misconduct. United States v Conover, 845 F2d 266 (11th Cir 1988). At last word,
the Eleventh Circuit had not acted on the government's petition for en banc rehearing of
the panel decision. Letter from John A. DeVault, III, defendants' counsel, to author, July
22, 1988 (on file, University of Chicago Law Review office).
261 See, for example, Russell v State, 53 Miss 367, 382 (1876) ("Nothing can be more
revolting to a sense of justice or decency than the idea of the life or liberty of a citizen
depending upon the maudlin deliberations of drunken jurors.").
262 Abandoning traditional doctrine, courts might conclude that the presence of a substantial number of jurors whose behavior remained unimpeached could provide an adequate
internal corrective for the bias, incompetence or misconduct of a few. In situations in which
the judiciary had no opportunity to correct the error prior to the verdict, the misconduct or
misunderstanding of a minority of the jury might be treated as harmless so long as a substantial majority (say, five members of a six person jury or nine or ten of a twelve person
jury) apparently had performed properly. See Brief for the United States at 49-50 n 35,
Tanner v United States, 107 S Ct 2739 (1987); but see Parkerv Gladden, 385 US 363, 366
(1966) (even when conviction by a nonunanimous jury is permissible, a defendant is "entitled to be tried by 12, not 9 or even 10, impartial and unprejudiced jurors"). In states that
permit nonunanimous verdicts, a rule permitting jurors to impeach their verdicts might conceivably lead outvoted jurors deliberately to engage in misconduct in the hope that this
misconduct would invalidate a verdict approved by the majority. Although this danger
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subjects criminal defendants to punishment on the basis of bias,
incompetence, and caprice, mocking our claim of adherence to the
rule of law. Reality does not evaporate when courts refuse to receive proof of it.
Overshadowing our evidentiary rules is a constitutional command: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury .... 263 The
Supreme Court held in Tannerthat the trial court's refusal to consider the jurors' testimony did not deprive the defendants of this
Sixth Amendment right. 64 In retrospect, it seems unfortunate that
the authors of the Sixth Amendment failed to write it somewhat
differently: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial, awake, and
unstoned jury." The Framers may have thought that some things
went without saying; and in Tanner, the Supreme Court shunted
aside an elemental violation of due process principles.
V.

CONCLUSION:

A

FAIR AND WORKABLE JURY SYSTEM

This article has focused primarily on three recent Supreme
Court decisions concerning the jury. Together they depict a criminal justice system without clear priorities in which symbols have
become more important than substance-a system dominated by
pragmatism and the hope of muddling through rather than by visions and hopes of justice.
In McKleskey v Kemp,265 the Supreme Court declined to hold
America's racially discriminatory administration of the death penalty unconstitutional. In Turner v Murray,"6 6 however, it manifested a symbolic opposition to racial discrimination by requiring
prospective jurors in some capital cases to answer an insulting
question. The Court added one more gargoyle to the front end of
the temple of justice while turning its eyes from back-end outcomes. The Court's approach appeared to be, "Procedure yes, substance no."
In Batson v Kentucky,2 67 the Supreme Court did not prevent
prosecutors and defense attorneys from discriminating on many inseems small (and unsubstantiated by evidence that jurors have sought to subvert verdicts by
engaging in the sorts of misconduct that courts currently consider), the risk might support a
requirement of proof of misconduct on the part of more than one or two jurors.
''
26
265
26
267

US Const, Amend VI.
107 S Ct at 2750-51.
481 US 279 (1987).

476 US at 28. See text at notes 21-36.
476 US 79 (1986).
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vidious grounds in the selection of trial jurors. In a largely symbolic display of opposition to one form of discrimination, however,
it built another front-end gargoyle-one that dwarfs the Turner v
Murray statuary in its ugliness and size. The Court devised burdensome procedural mechanisms to generate disturbing substantive outcomes-for example, that it is permissible to exclude from
'
a jury "the Dallas prosecutor's nightmare," 268
an overweight woman schoolteacher from New Jersey with a limp who is both black
and Jewish and who never goes hunting.
In Tanner v United States,2 6 9 the Court that had invented the
Batson hearing upheld convictions returned by a group of apparently drugged, drunken, and dozing jurors. When the issue was the
review of a jury's back-end product rather than the proliferation of
front-end procedures, considerations of judicial economy became
important. There was no indication in Tanner that the prosecutor
had exercised his peremptory challenges improperly or that the
partying jury had failed to include an appropriate number of
blacks and whites. In our criminal justice system, that deficiency
apparently would have been more serious than the jurors' abuse of
alcohol, marihuana, and cocaine, and the defendants would have
been entitled to post-conviction relief.
Overshadowing the other ironies of the Supreme Court's jurytrial decisions is the rarity of jury trials in the American system of
criminal justice. For the overwhelming majority of defendants,
most refinements of voir dire procedure either do not matter or
matter primarily because they make jury trials less accessible. Battles over trial procedures typically disregard the pressures that our
legal system places on defendants to abandon the right to jury
trial. A system that can afford Batson hearings and that can expend its resources asking prospective jurors whether they are bigots apparently cannot afford to provide trials to the people it accuses of crime. Again, symbols appear more important than
substance.
Jury trials once were simple, straightforward, and expeditious
proceedings; and the right to jury trial was a right that defendants
got, not merely one that they had.27 0 Simplifying our trial
processes could reduce the perception that widespread subversion
of the right to jury trial is necessary.
268 See text at note 199.

107 S Ct 2739 (1987).
Langbein, 45 U Chi L Rev 263 (cited in note 216); Albert W. Alschuler, Plea
Bargainingand Its History, 79 Colum L Rev 1, 16, 33 (1979).
269
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The principal argument for jury trials can be stated in a
word-judges.2 In 1917, G. K. Chesterton added more words and
made this argument more eloquently:
Now, it is a terrible business to mark a man out for the vengeance of men. But it is a thing to which a man can grow accustomed, as he can to other terrible things ....
And the
horrible thing about all legal officials, even the best, about all
judges, magistrates, barristers, detectives, and policemen, is
not that they are wicked (some of them are good), not that
they are stupid (several of them are quite intelligent), it is
simply that they have got used to it.
Strictly, they do not see the prisoner in the dock; all they see
is the usual man in the usual place. They do not see the awful
court of judgment; they see only their own workshop. Therefore, the instinct of Christian civilisation has most wisely declared that into their judgments there shall upon every occasion be infused fresh blood and fresh thoughts from the
streets. Men shall come in who can see the court and the
crowd, and coarse faces of the policemen and professional
criminals, the wasted faces of the wastrels, the unreal faces of
the gesticulating counsel, and see it all as one sees a new picture or a ballet hitherto unvisited.
Our civilisation has decided, and very justly decided, that determining the guilt or innocence of men is a thing too important to be trusted to trained men. 2
Lay jurors have distinctive virtues in conducting the "business
[of] mark[ing] a man out for the vengeance of men." They also
have distinctive vices. Law-trained judges often may be alert to
governmental abuses in ways that nonprofessionals are not. I have
argued elsewhere that mixed tribunals of lay and professional
judges of the sort found on the European continent might best
utilize the distinctive characteristics of both groups in resolving is7
sues of guilt and punishment. 1
In light of the virtues of mixed tribunals, the Supreme Court's
21 See Duncan v Louisiana, 391 US 145, 156 (1968) (the right to jury trial guards
against "the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge").
272 Gilbert Keith Chesterton, Tremendous Trifles 80, 85-86 (Dodd, Mead, 1917).
273 Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the CriminalDefendant's Right to Trial:Alternatives to the Plea BargainingSystem, 50 U Chi L Rev 931, 997-1011 (1983).
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2 74 a decision
decision in Duncan v Louisiana,
generally understood

as precluding the states from experimenting with alternatives to
the jury trial, was probably unfortunate. Although I have argued
that Duncan may not in fact be as restrictive of departures from
the jury system as most observers assume,275 I also have recognized
that, for the moment, the prospect of employing mixed tribunals or
other alternatives to the'27jury trial in American felony cases is
6
"probably a pipe dream.

American trial procedures could be simplified, however, either
by departing from the jury trial format or by making greater efforts to realize the virtues of this format. The appropriate alternative to departing from the jury trial is adhering to its ideals. The
American jury trial has become unworkable largely because we
have tried to have things both ways, sometimes romanticizing jurors as zealous yeomen alert to abuses of governmental power and
sometimes treating them as helpless, weak-minded, irrational, vindictive, and easily swayed children.
If we accepted the democratic rhetoric of the jury system, we
would select juries so that they reflected the breadth of our communities rather than the group left over when lawyers had expended their peremptory challenges on pet hates. Accepting the
premises of the jury system would mean viewing jurors neither as
child savants nor as child simpletons but as responsible adults. It
would mean abandoning our cumbersome, patronizing rules of evidence and trusting jurors with the facts. It would mean respecting
the jurors' privacy, abandoning our probing of their psyches, beliefs, and practices in extended voir dire examinations. It would
mean permitting prospective jurors to serve on juries unless, after
asking only the questions needed to uncover interests and biases
that would equally disqualify professional judges, grounds for their
recusal appeared.
Treating jurors as grown-ups would demand that they, no less
than trial judges and other officials, be held to adult standards of
responsibility. Viewing as sacrosanct the back-end product of jury
trials while relying almost entirely on front-end controls to prevent
injustice is fundamentally unsound. The front-end controls are
cumbersome, expensive, wasteful and weak. Courts should not turn
aside clear proof in particular cases that these controls have failed.
The Supreme Court has held that the Fifth Amendment's Double
274 391 US 145 (1968).
175

Alschuler, 50 U Chi L Rev at 995-97 (cited in note 273).

276

Id at 1010.
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Jeopardy Clause precludes the review of jury verdicts of acquittal,21 but nothing in the Constitution forbids judicial review of the
appropriateness of criminal convictions. Judges need neither imprison defendants whom they believe to be innocent nor uphold
convictions by jurors who have abandoned their responsibilities.
Just as the jury system provides a safeguard against the excesses, insensitivities, and biases of judges, judges should check the
excesses, insensitivities, and biases of jurors. Bringing the distinct
perspectives of jurors and professional judges to bear on an issue
promotes greater confidence in its resolution than yielding the decision to either lay or professional judges alone. As Chesterton suggested, determining guilt or innocence may be "a thing too important to be trusted to trained men, ' 278 but it is also a thing too
important to be trusted to anyone in the absence of the sort of
oversight and review afforded the actions of most governmental of7 9
ficials. Justice Black's opinion for the Court in Toth v Quarles
struck an appropriate balance:
Juries fairly chosen from different walks of life bring into the
jury box a variety of different experiences, feelings, intuitions
and habits.... On many occasions, fully known to the Founders of this country, jurors-plain people-have.., stood up
in defense of liberty against the importunities of judges and
despite prevailing hysteria and prejudices ....Unfortunately,
instances could also be cited where jurors have themselves betrayed the cause of justice by verdicts based on prejudice or
pressures. In such circumstances independent trial judges and
independent appellate judges have a most important place
under our constitutional plan ....
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See, for example, United States v Ball, 163 US 662, 671 (1896); United States v

Scott, 437 US 82 (1978).
279 See text at note 272.
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